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INTRODUCTION
Public access to government information is one of our nation’s
1
2
most cherished and established principles. Yet in times of war, this
and other freedoms are often eclipsed in favor of competing
3
government interests. Americans have come to expect a degree of
transparency in their government: for nearly forty years, the
4
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) has entitled the public to
obtain certain information through mandatory government
disclosures. However, the United States government, with President
1. In signing the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) into law, President
Lyndon B. Johnson declared, “[t]his legislation springs from one of our most
essential principles: [a] democracy works best when the people have all the
information that the security of the Nation permits.” H. REP. NO. 104-795, at 8
(1966), cited in Paul M. Schoenhard, Note, Disclosure of Government Information Online:
A New Approach From an Existing Framework, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 497, 499 (2002).
2. President Bush commented, “[w]e’re an open society, but we’re at war . . . .
Foreign terrorists and agents must never again be allowed to use our freedoms
against us.” Brad Knickerbocker, Security Concerns Drive Rise in Secrecy, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 3, 2001, at 1, cited in Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 503. “From
Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the right of habeas corpus during the Civil War, to
the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, to the surveillance of
anti-Vietnam War protestors and civil rights leaders, we see that our freedoms and
liberties are often sacrificed in times of conflict.” Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 508
(citing Adam Cohen, Rough Justice; The Attorney General Has Powerful New Tools to Fight
Terrorism. Has He Gone Too Far?, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 30); cf. Stephen Gidiere &
Jason Forrester, Balancing Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 139, 139 (2002) (noting that the September 11, 2001 terrorists
“availed themselves of the everyday freedoms that Americans take for granted,” such
as purchasing an airline ticket over the Internet and enrolling in a pilot training
course). Once information is released to the public, it may eventually fall into
terrorists’ hands. Id.
3. “The goal of an informed citizenry and open government is often at odds
with other public interests,” such as “maintaining an efficient and effective
government,” and the “preservation of the confidentiality of sensitive information.”
Jeffrey Norgle, Comment, Revising the Freedom of Information Act for the Information Age:
The Electronic Freedom of Information Act, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 817,
822 (1996) (tracing Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) developments in response
to public needs, citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988)). See also Administrative Law,
Adjudicatory Issues, and Privacy Ramifications of Creating a Department of Homeland
Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Rep. Watt, Member, House Comm.
on the Judiciary) (arguing that the government’s goal of protecting its citizens “will
involve sacrificing personal liberties”); Laura Parker et al., Secure Often Means Secret,
USA TODAY, May 16, 2002, at 1A, 4A (reporting that “[t]he U.S. government often
has embraced secrecy during crises,” particularly during times of war); Robert L.
Saloschin, The Department of Justice and the Explosion of Freedom of Information Act
Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2000) (arguing that when the public must
be protected from “ruthless adversaries, even the perception of openness in
government can be devastating”); Laura A. White, Note, The Need for Governmental
Secrecy: Why the U.S. Government Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of
National Security, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1079 (2003) (citing Michael Kelly, Secrecy,
Case by Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at A23, and arguing that democratic ideals
must occasionally be offended in order for the United States to maintain national
security and freedom).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002).
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George W. Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft at the helm,
recently set in motion mechanisms that will restrict the flow of
5
government information to the requesting public.
As the horror of al Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attack still haunts
the nation’s consciousness, the U.S. remains a target for terrorist
6
groups. Despite a massive effort to eliminate terrorist networks,
national security experts argue that the U.S. is just as vulnerable to
7
attack as it was on September 10, 2001. Although scattered, the al
Qaeda network may remain capable of terrible attacks despite our
8
efforts.
While the U.S. government attempts to strengthen national
security to meet this evolving threat, a re-examination of some of our
country’s core values and principles is an entirely proper public
9
response.
In particular, one must examine whether our
government’s high degree of transparency, though serving a valuable
10
social purpose, may also provide support to terrorists. Although
5. See discussion infra Parts II & III (reviewing FOIA developments postSeptember 11, 2001).
6. See Dan Eggen, Risk of Terror Attack Climbs, U.S. Finds, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,
2003, at A10 (reporting senior U.S. intelligence officials’ conclusions that the risk of
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil has increased significantly); see also THE WHITE HOUSE,
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
AND KEY ASSETS 7 (2003) [hereinafter NSPPCIKA] (arguing that our enemies
“consider terrorism an effective weapon to use against us, and they will continue to
employ such tactics” until the U.S. can prove it is no longer effective).
7. See Barton Gellman, In U.S., Terrorism’s Peril Undiminished, WASH. POST, Dec.
24, 2002, at A01, A06 (quoting a Bush insider as stating that “[w]ith untold billions
spent—money, personnel and blood—how can we claim any kind of success if we’re
just as vulnerable as before?”); see also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMERICA—
STILL UNPREPARED, STILL IN DANGER 13 (2002) (reporting that a year after September
11, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a terrorist
attack on U.S. soil), available at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland_TF.pdf (on file
with the American University Law Review). In all likelihood, the next attack will
result in a large number of casualties and widespread disruption to American lives
and the economy. Id.
8. Gellman, supra note 7. As it did with box cutters and jetliners on September
11, 2001, al Qaeda could make innovative use of ordinary technology to attack the
U.S. Id. Of particular concern to security experts is the possibility of undiscovered
“sleeper cells” on U.S. soil. Id.
9. See Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1115, 1116, 1124 (2002) (commenting on the expansion of “government secrecy,”
including the denial of public access to government information post-September 11,
2001). In reconsidering our core freedoms, debate has swirled around FOIA
because al Qaeda groups in Afghanistan were found with copies of General
Accounting Office reports and other government information obtained through
FOIA. See 148 CONG. REC. H5828-06 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Davis) [hereinafter Statement of Davis] (arguing that while the United States works
to protect national security against terrorism, “we also need to ensure that we are not
arming terrorists”).
10. See, e.g., Homeland Security Efforts: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science,
107th Cong. 32 (2002) (statement of James K. Kallstrom, Special Advisor to
Governor Pataki on Counter-Terrorism) [hereinafter Statement of Kallstrom]
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certain information disclosed under FOIA may be important for
public safety, other information obtained through FOIA could also
put us at risk. In the past two years alone, public requests under
FOIA have yielded important public safety information—from
11
reports about excessive levels of mercury in canned tuna, to details
about the presence of anthrax spores in Washington, D.C.’s
12
Brentwood mail facility.
However, the importance of this
information must now be weighed against frightening new evidence
that the U.S. military found al Qaeda groups in possession of U.S.
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) Reports and government
13
information obtained through FOIA.
Specifically, investigators
discovered “detailed maps and drawings of sensitive infrastructure
14
locations” in caves in Afghanistan and in al Qaeda training camps.
The U.S. government’s knee-jerk reaction to such evidence was to
restrict public access to government information in the name of
15
national security. The government accomplished this goal through
agency guidance in new FOIA memoranda and through a broad
FOIA exemption for the new Department of Homeland Security.
Although these recent FOIA developments did not receive much
16
attention from the mainstream news media, Americans will be
shocked to realize the practical implications of losing their right to
17
enjoy free and open access to government information.

(arguing that new FOIA legislation must ensure that “sensitive information about
potential threats to the Nation’s critical infrastructure” must not “fall into the wrong
hands” and be used to attack us); THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY 56 (2002) [hereinafter NSHS] (arguing that while it is
important to protect public access to government information, that right must be
balanced against protecting national security).
11. The National Security Archive, The U.S. Freedom of Information Act at 35: Nearly
2 Million Requests Last Year at a Cost of One Dollar Per Citizen; National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book Number 51 [hereinafter FOIA at 35], at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB51/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2003)
(on file with the American University Law Review).
12. See Judicial Watch Files Criminal Complaint With U.S. Attorney Roscoe C. Howard
Over Brentwood Anthrax Cover-Up (Dec. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Anthrax Lawsuit]
(detailing information disclosed in a FOIA request that U.S. Postal Service and U.S.
government officials knew four days before closing the Brentwood mail facility that
envelopes had leaked anthrax spores, putting the employee population at risk), at
http://www.judicialwatch.org/2817.shtml (on file with the American University Law
Review).
13. Statement of Davis, supra note 9.
14. Statement of Kallstrom, supra note 10.
15. See discussion infra Parts II & III (reviewing the reduction of FOIA disclosures
in the past year).
16. See infra notes 249-50 (discussing the media’s lack of coverage of FOIA
developments in the past year).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing the practical implications of the
Department of Homeland Security FOIA exemption).
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These efforts to erode FOIA will only provide a false sense of
security at the expense of the public’s right to information. This new
framework broadens the preexisting FOIA exemption framework, is
18
largely unnecessary, and may even endanger public safety. Congress
has already carved out FOIA exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552 in order to
safeguard sensitive records, without the severe limitations imposed by
19
the new FOIA guidelines.
This Comment will reexamine the spirit and purpose behind FOIA,
arguing that the American public’s right to governmental
transparency, conceived during the national security crises of the
Cold War, is as vital today as it was nearly four decades ago. Part I of
this Comment will examine FOIA’s history and mechanics. Part II
will address the role of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in shaping
agency decisions in the FOIA request process and assess the roles that
key figures in the Bush Administration play in restricting the
availability of government information post-September 11, 2001. Part
III will trace the development of the new Department of Homeland
Security and evaluate the broad FOIA exemption applicable to this
new cabinet-level department. Finally, Part IV will argue that recent
FOIA developments will restrict public access to government
information, and that these new policies are unnecessary in light of
the preexisting FOIA exemption framework under 5 U.S.C. § 552. In
sum, this Comment concludes that FOIA developments in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001 have created a climate of
nondisclosure, and that the “war against terrorism” does not justify
the magnitude of recent data restrictions imposed by the U.S.
government.
I.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT’S HISTORY AND MECHANICS
20

Enacted in 1966, FOIA was the first federal law to establish an
effective legal right of access to government information on the basis
21
of openness and accountability. Before FOIA, the public bore the
18. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1 (describing how the Department of Homeland
Security FOIA exemption broadens the preexisting FOIA exemption framework).
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2002).
20. Congress passed FOIA “in the late 1960s, during the apparent stalemate in
the Vietnam War—an event that stimulated popular distrust of government.”
Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1401.
21. See Scott A. Faust, Note, National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA:
The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement, 25 B.C. L. REV. 611, 643 & n.3 (1984)
(quoting Senator Long’s comments prior to the enactment of FOIA that “our
purpose in introducing [FOIA] is that a necessary corollary to the right of a
democratic people to participate in governmental affairs is the right to acquire
information,” 111 CONG. REC. S2797 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1965)).
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22

burden of demonstrating a right to access government records.
Now, however, FOIA grants the public a “right to know” standard for
access to government information, shifting the burden of proof from
23
the public to the government agency seeking to deny access. FOIA
has become one of the primary means by which the public informs
itself about its government, and it has been used to obtain
24
information crucial to the public interest. Recently, for example,
public use of FOIA exposed information on the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration’s projected $4 billion cost overrun for the
international space station and how prescription rates for Ritalin
25
varied from region to region.
Following the U.S.’s lead, laws
instituting FOIA’s principles of transparency in government have
26
spread across the globe.
27
28
Congress amended FOIA four times between 1974 and 1996.
The amendments between 1974 and 1986 changed certain
procedures, modified exemptions, protected sensitive law
29
enforcement information, and created new fee provisions.
The
1996 amendment, known as the Electronic FOIA (“EFOIA”)

22. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: UPDATE ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1996 ELECTRONIC FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AMENDMENTS
4
(2002)
[hereinafter
GAO],
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/gao02493.pdf (on file with the American University
Law Review). FOIA replaced the disclosure provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946, which required the government to withhold material
requiring secrecy in the public interest or material pertinent only to the internal
affairs of an agency. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60
Stat. 237 (1946). The ultimate effect of this legislation was to limit the amount of
information the government needed to disclose to the public. See Schoenhard, supra
note 1, at 498 (discussing the widely-held view that the Administrative Procedure Act
actually limited public access to government information).
23. GAO, supra note 22, at 4.
24. See Thomas Blanton, The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POL’Y, July 1, 2002, at
50 (reporting that FOIA is the world’s most heavily invoked disclosure law).
25. FOIA at 35, supra note 11. In the past, public requests under FOIA led to the
disclosure of such controversial information as Army reports concerning the
massacre at My Lai. See John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act: A Fundamental
Contradiction, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1157, 1175 (1985) (citing N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1972, at
7, col. 1).
26. In particular, the past decade has witnessed an expansion in governmental
transparency worldwide. See Blanton, supra note 24, at 50 (reporting that in the past
decade, twenty-six countries, including Bulgaria, South Africa, Thailand, and Japan,
enacted disclosure statutes guaranteeing the right of access to government
information). In light of these developments, it is ironic that “secrecy has made the
most dramatic comeback” in the U.S.—the country that initially led the shift toward
government transparency. Id.
27. The Watergate scandal “intensified disclosure efforts and led to the 1974
amendments strengthening FOIA.” Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1404 (citing Pub. L.
No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994))).
28. GAO, supra note 22, at 4.
29. Id.
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30

amendment, effectively took FOIA to the Internet, requiring each
agency to post on its website guides to making FOIA requests.
Further, this amendment encouraged online public access to
government information by requiring agencies to make certain
31
information available in electronic form. As a result, government
32
websites thrived on the Internet.
33
FOIA provides public access to agency records through two
methods: affirmative agency disclosure and public request for
34
disclosure. Affirmative agency disclosure takes place through the
Federal Register publication of information (“the FOIA publication
requirement”) and the availability of certain records for public
35
inspection and copying (“the FOIA reading room requirement”).
Public request for disclosure, FOIA’s most well-known component,
allows any member of the public to request access to information
held by federal agencies without showing a need or reason for
36
seeking the information.
Although the public has a statutory right to request government
records, agencies are not always required to comply with FOIA
requests. Through nine exemptions, FOIA balances the value of
public disclosure against other important considerations, including
30. In response to lengthy delays and extensive request backlogs at agencies,
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced amendments to FOIA for electronic records in
1994, eventually leading President Clinton to sign the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act (“EFOIA”) amendment in October 1996. The National Security
Archive, The FOIA and President Bill Clinton, at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/
foia/clinton.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University
Law Review).
31. The EFOIA amendment encouraged online public access to government
information by requiring agencies to make six specific types of records, created on or
after November 1, 1996, available in electronic form. See GAO, supra note 22, at 8
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A)–(E) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(2)).
32. See Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 502 (surveying the availability of government
information on agency websites).
33. “Agency records” are defined as “documents that (1) are either created or
obtained by an agency and (2) are in that agency’s physical possession and under its
control at the time of the FOIA request.” A Blackletter Statement of Federal
Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 61-62 (2002).
34. GAO, supra note 22, at 4; see also Norgle, supra note 3, at 824 (listing the
information that agencies are obligated to release under FOIA). “First, agencies
must publish substantive rules, statements of general policy and information on
agency organization and procedures in the Federal Register.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1) (1998)). “Second, agencies must make final adjudicatory opinions,
statements of policy not published in the Federal Register, and administrative staff
manuals and instructions available for inspection and copying.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(2) (1998)). “Third, agencies must make available other records not falling
within the first two categories.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1998)).35.GAO, supra
note 22, at 4.
36. Id.
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national security and the protection of sensitive business
37
Rather than requiring agencies to withhold
information.
information subject to an exemption, agencies are granted discretion
38
to determine whether to safeguard or disclose that information.
Moreover, FOIA does not provide access to records held by the U.S.
39
Congress or the federal judiciary, state or local government agency
40
records, or those held by private businesses or individuals. Each
state and the District of Columbia have statutes governing public
41
Finally, requesters dissatisfied with the
access to their records.
amount of information they receive pursuant to an exemption may
42
seek redress in the U.S. District Courts.
In an effort to protect national security, recent government actions
expanded the FOIA exemption framework and restricted the public’s
43
ability to access sensitive government information. The Executive
Branch, particularly the DOJ, has thus far played a key role in
creating a new climate of nondisclosure whereby the public could be
increasingly denied access to government information.
II. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FOIA IMPLEMENTATION
A. Background
The DOJ plays an integral role in interpreting and developing
FOIA, overseeing agencies’ compliance with FOIA, defending
agencies’ decisions in court, and serving as the primary source of
44
policy guidance for agencies. The number of FOIA-related matters
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2002); see Joseph Summerill, Is It Safe For Your Client
To Provide The Government With Homeland Security Data?, 50 FED. LAWYER 24, 26 (2003)
(arguing that the exemptions indicate that sometimes the interest in protecting
sensitive records outweighs the public interest of disclosure).
38. See Ronald Backes, Comment, Freedom, Information, Security, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 927, 976 (2000) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293
(1979)).
39. The National Security Archive, About the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/aboutfoia.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003)
(on file with the American University Law Review).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Judges determine the propriety of agency withholdings de novo and agencies
must bear the burden of sustaining their nondisclosure actions. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B)-(C) (2002). But see Moon, supra note 25, at 1178, 1188 (citing
disagreement over whether judges objectively apply FOIA, and concluding that
“judicial construction of the FOIA is an exercise in subjectivity”).
43. See discussion infra Parts II & III (reviewing FOIA developments in the
Executive and Legislative branches post-September 11, 2001).
44. DOJ published a newsletter called FOIA Update, wrote A Short Guide to the
Freedom of Information Act, and regularly issued an analytical Freedom Of Information
Case List of court decisions in order to provide the government with a better
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at DOJ exploded in the mid-1970s and has increased steadily. The
public submitted 1,965,919 FOIA requests to federal agencies in fiscal
year 1999, and agencies processed 1,939,668 requests that same
46
year. Along with the massive number of requests came high levels of
47
backlogs as agencies scrambled to meet the public’s needs.
Because DOJ plays such a critical role in shaping agency responses
48
to FOIA requests, several Attorneys General left their particular
49
The Attorney General
Administration’s mark on FOIA policy.
traditionally issues a new FOIA policy statement at the beginning of a
new Administration—at least when the incoming President has a
50
different political affiliation from the former.
The various
Administrations’ approaches to FOIA are extremely important
because they ultimately determine how DOJ attorneys will represent
agency decisions to withhold information. The FOIA policies of the
understanding of FOIA. Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1404-05. In 2000, DOJ developed
FOIA Post, a means of disseminating FOIA information to federal agencies that is
located on the DOJ FOIA website at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
mainpage.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
45. Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1403. Saloschin, a former attorney in the DOJ’s
Office of Legal Counsel, argues that the reasons behind this expansion in FOIArelated matters included the “vigorous use of FOIA by Ralph Nader and his
associates; the growing popularity of FOIA as a form of pre-trial discovery among
litigators; the use of FOIA by various scholars, advocates, and authors; and the use of
FOIA on behalf of businesses involved in publishing or in government procurement
or regulation.” Id. at 1401, 1403-04.
46. See, e.g., FOIA at 35, supra note 11 (providing a summary of FOIA requests
filed in fiscal year 1999). George Washington University’s National Security Archive,
the nation’s primary non-profit FOIA user, also collects data pertaining to its own
FOIA requests. Id.
47. For example, on one National Security Archive request filed in 1990, the
Central Intelligence Agency took nine years to deny fully twenty-two documents, and
another seven months to deny the National Security Archive’s appeal. Id. See, e.g.,
Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1404 (arguing that in the 1970s, “appeals to the Attorney
General from initial denials of DOJ records skyrocketed from about six per year to
approximately a thousand,” leading to the creation of a new appeals office); GAO,
supra note 22, at 42 (detailing the Department of Energy’s median time to process a
request in Fiscal Year 1999 as 250 days).
48. Saloschin writes that “[t]he DOJ must balance several functions that
potentially conflict in FOIA work.” Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1405. DOJ serves as
the legal advisor to the government and litigates on behalf of almost all federal
agencies. Id. However, because the DOJ is the government’s “law enforcement
arm,” it must ensure agency compliance with all laws. See id. at 1405-06 (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552(e)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). Therefore, conflicts may arise when
DOJ performs more than one of these functions. Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1406.
49. See Norgle, supra note 3, at 825 (arguing that the Executive Branch under the
Clinton Administration made an effort to further strengthen federal agency
adherence to FOIA, citing Administration Tells Agencies to Tilt Toward FOIA Disclosure,
62 U.S.L.W. 15, 20 (1993)).
50. Such statements were issued in May 1977 by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell,
in May 1981 by Attorney General William French Smith, in October 1993 by Attorney
General Janet Reno, and in 2001 by Attorney General John Ashcroft. GAO, supra
note 22, at 10.
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Clinton and Bush Administrations provide an interesting study of
contrasting approaches to government disclosures.
B. The Expansion of Disclosure Under the Clinton Administration
President William J. Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno
ushered in an era of increased FOIA disclosures through concurrent
51
FOIA memoranda issued on October 4, 1993. President Clinton’s
memorandum reaffirmed the value of a free and open society and
asked agencies to “renew their commitment to [FOIA], to its
underlying principles of government openness, and to its sound
52
administration.”
Attorney General Reno’s memorandum further
developed the Administration’s concept of these principles,
overturning the Reagan Administration’s “substantial legal basis”
threshold for agency defense and replacing it with a “presumption of
53
disclosure.”
Specifically, Attorney General Reno’s memorandum established a
“foreseeable harm” standard, committing DOJ to defend an agency’s
decision to withhold information “only in those cases where the
agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an
54
interest protected by that exemption.” Reno further instructed
agencies that “[w]here an item of information might technically or
arguably fall within an exemption, it ought not to be withheld from a
55
FOIA requester unless it need be,” and stated that the principle of
openness in government should be applied in “every disclosure and
56
The Administration believed that this
non-disclosure decision.”
policy best served the public interest because it achieved FOIA’s main
objective—“maximum responsible disclosure of government
57
information—while preserving essential confidentiality.” This policy
51. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Heads of All Federal
Departments and Agencies re: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993)
[hereinafter Reno Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_
updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
52. Memorandum from William J. Clinton, President of the United States, to
Heads of Departments and Agencies re: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4,
1993) [hereinafter Clinton Memorandum], available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/whinitial.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
In handling requests, President Clinton petitioned agencies to handle requests for
information in a “customer-friendly manner.” Id.
53. Reno Memorandum, supra note 51. The memorandum also pointed out that
many departments have backlogs due to fewer resources and heavy workloads, and
identified this as a serious problem. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Reno Memorandum, supra note 51 (justifying the Clinton
Administration’s presumption of disclosure).
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remained in effect throughout the Clinton Administration, and
58
agencies continued to follow this guidance until October 2001.
C. The Erosion of FOIA Under the Bush Administration
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 led the Bush
Administration to rethink government policies toward disclosure of
59
government information. FOIA was not immune: Attorney General
John Ashcroft introduced a new FOIA policy memorandum on
60
October 12, 2001 (“Ashcroft Memorandum”).
In the
memorandum, Attorney General Ashcroft encouraged the protection
of national security, sensitive business information, and personal
61
privacy. Specifically, the Ashcroft Memorandum assured agencies
that “the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they
lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse
impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important
62
records.”
This memorandum officially replaced the Clinton
Administration’s “foreseeable harm” standard with a new “sound
63
legal basis” standard governing DOJ’s defense of FOIA lawsuits.
58. See FOIA POST, New Attorney General FOIA Memorandum Issued (reporting that
Attorney General Ashcroft’s FOIA memorandum superseded the Clinton
Administration’s 1993 FOIA policy), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001
foiapost19.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
59. See, e.g., Press Briefing, The White House, The President’s Announcement on
Homeland Security (June 6, 2002) [hereinafter Homeland Defense Press Briefing]
(asserting that “in times of crisis, we ask our leaders to do big things, to respond to
the crisis”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/
20020606-6.html (on file with the American University Law Review); Blanton, supra
note 24 (arguing that it became apparent to our government that increased
governmental secrecy could be a “crucial weapon in the war against terror”); Parker,
supra note 3 (reporting a “dramatic turnabout from the policies of the past three
decades,” and that since September 11, 2001, “the Bush Administration has moved
more quickly than any administration since World War II to make government
activities, documents and other information secret”).
60. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of all Federal
Departments and Agencies re: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/
011012.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
61. Id. Attorney General Ashcroft directed agencies to make a “full and
deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy
interests” when determining whether to make disclosures under FOIA. Id. Critics
argue this turns FOIA into a balancing act. See Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 504
(arguing that the Ashcroft Memorandum, in establishing the “concepts of
Government transparency and freedom as mutually exclusive goals” of the DOJ,
made FOIA “more of a balancing act than a statutory mandate”).
62. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 60 (emphasis added). “The result
appears to be that the DOJ will support an agency withholding information from the
public unless (a) there is no chance the DOJ will win the subsequent lawsuit; or
(b) to support the agency in question might disclose other Government
information.” Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 504.
63. Id. Justification for this deviation came from the realities of September 11,
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This is a higher threshold for disclosure than the Clinton
Administration’s policy of defending agency decisions to withhold
information only where disclosure would likely harm a party
protected by the exemptions.
Approximately five months after agencies received the Ashcroft
Memorandum, amidst continuing public anger over the September
64
11, 2001 attacks, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card issued
further FOIA guidance imploring agencies to safeguard government
records relating to weapons of mass destruction (“Card
65
Memorandum”). The Card Memorandum instructed agencies to
review government information “regarding weapons of mass
destruction, as well as other information that could be misused to
66
harm the security of our nation and the safety of our people,” and
required agencies to report their reviews to the Office of Homeland
67
In
Security no later than ninety days after March 19, 2002.
response, agencies removed public access to thousands of
68
documents.
A supplemental memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, provided
69
guidance on implementation of the Card Memorandum.
Not
surprisingly, Kimberly gave a broad definition for “sensitive
information,” defining it as “government information regarding
weapons of mass destruction, as well as other information that could
be misused to harm the security of our nation or threaten public

2001. To buttress this memorandum, the Bush Administration urges agencies to use
FOIA exemptions to prevent potential disclosures relating to the nation’s critical
infrastructure and to protect agency information that could enable a party to unleash
further terror on the U.S. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 60.
64. See Mark Tapscott, Too Many Secrets, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25
(connecting the restriction of government disclosures with the al Qaeda September
11, 2001 attacks).
65. Memorandum from Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of
Staff, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies re: Action to Safeguard
Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive
Documents Related to Homeland Security (Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Card
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm
(on file with the American University Law Review).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Tapscott, supra note 64; see infra note 143 and accompanying text (detailing
specific reports of information removed from government websites).
69. Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Director, Information
Security Oversight Office, to Departments and Agencies re:
Safeguarding
Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive Records
Related to Homeland Security (Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Kimberly
Memorandum], at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm (on file
with the American University Law Review).
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70

safety.”
Kimberly elaborated on the protection of classified
71
information under Executive Order 12958 (“Classified National
Security Information”) and information that had been unclassified or
72
declassified. Importantly, Kimberly also directed that the disclosure
of sensitive but unclassified information should be “carefully
considered, on a case-by-case basis,” alongside the “benefits that
result from the open and efficient exchange of scientific, technical,
73
and like information.”
Finally, Kimberly instructed all agencies that any FOIA request for
records containing sensitive information be processed in accordance
with the Ashcroft Memorandum—“giving full and careful
74
consideration to all applicable FOIA exemptions.” Coupled with
the broad new FOIA exemption for the Department of Homeland
Security described in the next section, the federal government, under
President Bush, has created an environment in which the public
75
could be denied FOIA’s full benefits.
III. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
A. The Origins of a Department of Homeland Security
Congress and the President created the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist
76
attacks. In the hours following the attacks, government employees
from all agencies scrambled to provide assistance to the Bush

70. Id.
71. See id. (providing for the classification of information that would assist in the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction for up to twenty-five years, even
though there is a standard of declassifying classified information within ten years of
its original classification).
72. See id. (indicating that if the information never was classified and never was
disclosed to the public under proper authority, but could “reasonably be expected to
assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction, it should be
classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958”; if information was classified
and then declassified, but was never disclosed to the public “under proper authority,”
it should likewise be reclassified under Executive Order 12958).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that the Bush Administration’s FOIA
policy and the Department of Homeland Security’s broad FOIA exemption
contribute to an overall climate of nondisclosure).
76. Jessica Reaves, Homeland Security: A Primer, TIME (ONLINE ED.), Nov. 19, 2002,
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,391161,00.html (on file with
the American University Law Review). But see Homeland Defense Press Briefing,
supra note 59 (reporting that President Bush directed Vice President Cheney to
begin the task of looking at the current structure of the federal government and its
capability of addressing terrorist attacks in May 2001).
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77

Administration. When they encountered procedural red tape and
communication barriers, some opined that there should be one
unified department to combat and respond to future terrorist attacks
78
on U.S. soil. It took a little over a year for that request to evolve into
79
a new Cabinet-level agency.
80
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”) passed the House in
81
July 2002, but disputes over workers’ rights, as well as other
82
controversial provisions, impeded passage in the Senate for

77. Reaves, supra note 76.
78. Id. Indeed, President Bush’s initial proposal of a Cabinet-level Department
of Homeland Security called for “substantially transforming the current confusing
patchwork of government activities into a single department whose primary mission
is to protect our homeland.” Id.
79. President Bush initially established an Office of Homeland Security by
Executive Order on October 8, 2001. See Press Release, The White House, Executive
Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security (Oct. 8, 2001) (establishing the
Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html. (on file with
the American University Law Review). Senators Joseph Lieberman and Arlen
Specter subsequently introduced Senate legislation to create a Cabinet-level
Department of Homeland Security. See Press Release, Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Lieberman, Specter Offer Homeland Defense Legislation
(Oct. 11, 2001), at http://www.senate.gov/ ~gov_affairs/101101homedefpress.htm
(arguing that the country needs an executive-level department to carry out the
functions of homeland defense) (on file with the American University Law Review).
The idea for a Cabinet-level department was based largely on the recommendations
of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly known as the
Hart-Rudman Commission. Id. See also Critical Infrastructure Protection: Who’s In
Charge?: Hearing of the S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement
of Sen. Cleland, Member, S. Governmental Affairs Comm.) [hereinafter Statement
of Cleland] (describing the Commission’s finding that it was inevitable a terrorist
attack would occur, it was just a matter of when and recommending a “full-blown”
homeland defense agency). After President Bush officially supported the creation of
a Department of Homeland Security in early June 2002, see Homeland Defense Press
Briefing, supra note 59 (supporting the creation of a Department of Homeland
Security), it was only a matter of time before the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(“HSA”) passed in the House and Senate.
80. H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
81. While most Democrats argued that DHS employees should be given the same
protections as other government employees, President Bush and other Republicans
responded that the President “should have the power to hire, fire, and discipline any
staff member for any reason” because “the sensitivity of this department’s mission
demand[s] fast action.” Reaves, supra note 76. This debate continued in the Senate
for months, until the widespread Republican gains in the midterm elections brought
both parties to the “bargaining table” and paved the way for the HSA’s ultimate
passage. Id.
82. Provisions allowing guns in the cockpit, as well as small pox vaccinations, are
included in the final Act. Compromise Reached on Homeland Security Bill, CNN, Nov. 13,
2002 [hereinafter Compromise], at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/
11/12/homeland.security/index.html (on file with the American University Law
Review); see Reaves, supra note 76 (describing the debate over a “Total Information
Awareness” system, which would give the government “virtually unfettered access to
private information exchanged between U.S. citizens,” including e-mail, banking
records and travel documents).
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83

months.
After Republicans gained seats in the November 2002
midterm elections, the HSA became President Bush’s main priority
and quickly moved through both houses of Congress, reflecting the
84
President’s “dramatically enhanced clout.”
The newly-created DHS marks the first major government
restructuring since the creation of the Department of Energy in
85
86
1977, and the creation of the nation’s third largest federal agency.
With a beginning budget of $37 billion, DHS encompasses 170,000
workers from twenty-two agencies, including the Secret Service,
87
Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and Customs Service.
The
Department’s mission to coordinate counter-terrorism measures and
preemptive defense will be carried out through the Department’s
four divisions:
border and transportation security; emergency
preparedness and response; countermeasures for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks; and an intelligence
88
clearinghouse.
Buried deep within the HSA, however, is a troubling FOIA
89
development. Despite the DHS’s noble duty of protecting national
83. See Darren Samuelsohn, Homeland Security Bill Passes Senate With New FOIA
Exemptions Included, GREENWIRE, Nov. 20, 2002, available at Westlaw, 11/20/02 EEPGRW art. 6 (reporting that the new FOIA exemption “that gives U.S. industries,
including chemical manufacturers and utilities, an exemption from the [FOIA]” did
not gain the same degree of attention from Congress as did numerous other
homeland security issues).
84. Helen Dewar, Homeland Bill Gets Boost, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2002, at A01. In
light of the midterm elections in November 2002, President Bush designated passage
of the HSA as his main priority for the rest of the Congressional term. Id. See Helen
Dewar, Homeland Security Legislation Becomes Republican Priority, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
2002, at A05 (reporting that House and Senate Republican leaders told President
Bush they would spend the post-election session attempting to pass the DHS
legislation); see also Compromise, supra note 82 (citing passage of the Homeland
Security Act as “the president’s top priority in the lame-duck Congress”). The HSA
passed the House by a vote of 299-121, and it passed the Senate by a vote of 90-9.
Samuelsohn, supra note 83.
85. Reaves, supra note 76.
86. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM
RISKS: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2003) [hereinafter GAO DHS], at
http://www.gao.gov/pas/2003/d03102.pdf (on file with the American University
Law Review).
87. Compromise, supra note 82. DHS must quickly and effectively integrate
disparate agencies and activities into one cohesive organization, marking a
government restructuring of unmatched proportions. GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 6.
88. Reaves, supra note 76.
89. See 148 CONG. REC. S11405-03, S11423 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) [hereinafter Statement of Leahy] (arguing that the Homeland Security
Act of 2002’s FOIA provisions are “entirely unnecessary” to the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security). Senator Leahy, the leading FOIA champion in
the Senate, deemed the provision “the most severe weakening of [FOIA] in its 36year history.” Id. at S11425. Unlike the Ashcroft Memorandum, which implored
agencies to be more careful with the release of information, the HSA, through the
Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (“CIIA”), actually provides a blanket
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security, its establishing legislation provides a blanket FOIA
90
exemption for private industries supporting the nation’s critical
91
infrastructure.
B. A New FOIA Exemption Under the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002
In pertinent part, § 214(a)(1) of the HSA provides:
critical infrastructure information (including the identity of the
submitting person or entity) that is voluntarily submitted to a covered
Federal agency for use by that agency regarding the security of
critical infrastructure and protected systems . . . shall be exempt from
disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly
92
referred to as the Freedom of Information Act).

This provision, subtitled as the “Critical Infrastructure Act of 2002”
(“CIIA”), grants authority to impose a fine, up to a year of
imprisonment, or both, as well as removal from employment, upon
any government offender who discloses this protected infrastructure
93
information. The measure is an exact replica of the FOIA proposal
in the original House Act, which passed in July 2002. In the rush to
FOIA exemption: the agency cannot release any information provided by private
industry relating to the nation’s critical infrastructure.
That this extreme provision is buried deep in the HSA troubles many. See, e.g.,
Samuelsohn, supra note 83 (quoting Charles Davis, executive director of the
Freedom of Information Center at the University of Missouri School of Journalism as
stating that “by burying [the FOIA provision] in homeland security, it becomes
motherhood and apple pie”); Administrative Law, Adjudicatory Issues, and Privacy
Ramifications of Creating a Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 28
(2002) (statement of Peter Swire, Professor of Law, Ohio State University) (citing as
troubling the “apparently slipshod manner in which such an important topic was
inserted” into the HSA) [hereinafter Statement of Swire].
90. See Samuelsohn, supra note 83 (quoting an aide to Senator Leahy as stating
that the new FOIA exemptions permit the “federal government to trump any state’s
own FOIA protections.” The aide called the FOIA exemption under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 “about as blanket a pre-emption as you can get”).
91. The HSA defines “critical infrastructure” as the “systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters.” Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 2(4) (2002).
This is the same definition Congress used in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Such a broad definition means that this exemption
could apply broadly across many sectors, including the financial services and
telecommunications sectors.
92. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(a)(1) (2002)
(emphasis added).
93. Id. § 214(f); see Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors”: The
Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 648
(2003) (arguing that this prohibition against disclosure “gilds the lily of
confidentiality”).
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final passage in November, the Senate accepted the prior House
94
version of the legislation.
Implementation of the CIIA FOIA provision came one step closer
to fruition with the DHS’s issuance of interim final rules, effective
95
January 27, 2003.
The rules implement Executive Order 12958
96
(protecting “Classified National Security Information”) which
constitutes FOIA Exemption 1, and delineate the Department’s
97
general FOIA policy. Moreover, on April 15, 2003, DHS released a
proposed rule governing procedures for handling critical
98
infrastructure information under the new CIIA exemption.
The
proposed rule outlines procedures for the receipt and safeguarding
of critical infrastructure information and elaborates on the
permissible and prohibited disclosure of this information as provided
99
by the CIIA.
The CIIA FOIA provision will shield from public view sensitive
infrastructure data submitted voluntary to federal officials by critical
100
infrastructure owners and operators.
Our nation’s critical
infrastructure traditionally consists of sectors such as information and
101
communications, banking and finance,
transportation, and
94. See Compromise, supra note 82 (describing a compromise on labor rights that
allowed for rapid passage of the HSA); see also Samuelsohn, supra note 83 (reporting
that the last homeland security battle “steered clear” of FOIA).
95. According to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, the interim rule will
be issued without a delayed effective date because “notice and public procedure
[would be] impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest.”
Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Procedures for the Department of
Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 4056 (Jan. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. ch.
1 & pt. 5).
96. Classified National Security Information for the Department of Homeland
Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 4073 (Jan. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 7).
97. Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Procedures for the Department
of Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4056-63.
98. Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information; Proposed Rule,
68 Fed. Reg. 18,524 (Apr. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 29).
99. See id. at 18,528-18,529.
100. See Christopher J. Dorobek, Industry Still Leery About FOIA Rules, FED.
COMPUTER WEEK, July 29, 2002, at 12. Moreover, the provision will exempt
submitters from civil or antitrust liability and impose criminal penalties on
government employees who disclose the designated information. See Statement of
Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425 (asserting that “[c]riminalizing disclosures . . . is an
effective way to quash discussion and debate over many aspects of the Government’s
work”).
101. A June 2002 survey by Business Software Alliance, a technology industry
association, showed that seventy-four percent of surveyed technology professionals
felt “nearly certain” that a cyber attack would be launched against American financial
institutions by June 2003. William Matthews, Rep. Smith Sounds Cyberalarm, FED.
COMPUTER WEEK, July 29, 2002, at 12; see also Thomas P. Vartanian, September 11
Attacks Illustrated New Risks to Banking System, 167 AM. BANKER, Nov. 2, 2001 (citing an
increasing number of attacks on financial systems and arguing that increased
computer access to these systems could mean that these attacks are likely to
continue).
Of particular concern to Vartanian is that “[c]ritical security
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102

energy. Government officials argue that this measure will facilitate
public-private information sharing and will give the government a
toehold into the private sector so that it may respond quickly and
103
effectively to any attack on the nation’s critical infrastructure.
Among the information covered by the provision are data concerning
“any planned or past assessment, projection, or estimate of the
security vulnerability of a protected system or critical infrastructure
. . . any planned or past operational problem or solution . . . related
to the security of a protected system or critical infrastructure; or any
threat to the security of a protected system or critical
104
infrastructure.”
The CIIA FOIA provision shields from liability critical
infrastructure owners and operators who “voluntarily” report
105
information regarding vulnerabilities.
Importantly, some courts
infrastructure and data protection issues arise when a company’s electronic networks
and databases are compromised”; in the case of banks, information containing
“proprietary business information, monetary value, intellectual property, or customer
information” could be compromised or stolen. Id. Ultimately this could also lead to
adverse public relations if such an attack were to be disclosed to the public. Id.
For an assessment of how the events of September 11, 2001 have affected the
financial services industry, see id. (arguing that a “distinct shift” has occurred in the
financial services industry for several reasons, such as the likelihood of customer
records being more accessible to government officials and the need to reevaluate risk
exposure in the flow of money and information in the banking and payment systems
post-September 11, 2001).
102. MARK S. SAWYER, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS,
MISSIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND STRATEGIES 24 (2002) (on file with the American
University Law Review). Other critical infrastructure sectors include water supply,
emergency law enforcement services, emergency fire service and continuity of
government services, and public health services. Id.
103. John Tritak, director of the Commerce Department’s Critical Infrastructure
Assurance Office, argues that the real goal of the DHS legislation was to “create an
environment where dynamic information sharing is taking place and problems can
be dealt with in real time.” Brian Krebs, Critics Blast IT Loophole in Homeland Security
Plan, WASH. POST, July 24, 2002, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A58311-2002Jul24 (on file with the American University Law Review); see also
148 CONG. REC. S11562-03 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bennett)
[hereinafter Statement of Bennett] (arguing that because the private and public
sectors are increasingly interconnected and are terrorist targets, it makes sense for
both targets to share information with each other). See generally discussion infra Part
IV.C (listing the government’s reasons for wanting to facilitate public-private
information sharing relationships).
104. See Summerill, supra note 37, at 25, 26 (citing S. 1456 § 4(3) and noting that
industry views this type of information as proprietary data).
105. Industry seems pleased with this new blanket exemption. See, e.g., Darren
Samuelsohn, Senate in Home Stretch on Cabinet-level Bill with FOIA Exemption, ENV’T &
ENERGY DAILY, Nov. 18, 2002 (quoting Kate McGloon, a spokeswoman for the
American Chemistry Council, as stating that the new language is a “step in the right
direction” because it will give industry the assurance it needs to provide the
government with critical security data without fear that the information would be
released to the public and serve as a guidepost for future terrorist attacks), available
at Westlaw, 11/13/02 EEP-EED art. 2; Industry Exemption in Homeland Security Bill
Sparks Controversy, OIL DAILY, Nov. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101846383
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distinguish between information submitted voluntarily to the
government, and information required to be submitted to the
106
When the government seeks voluntary disclosure of
government.
business information, the government must keep that information
confidential “if it is of a kind that would customarily not be released
107
to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.” However,
if the government requires private entities to disclose information,
that information must be kept confidential only if its disclosure is
likely to (1) impair the government’s ability to obtain necessary
information in the future, or (2) “cause substantial harm to the
competitive position” of the entity from whom the government
108
obtained the information.
Prior to the HSA’s final passage, Senators Leahy, Bennett and
Levin reached a compromise that proposed to narrow the broad CIIA
FOIA provision but still provide additional nondisclosure protections
109
for certain sensitive records. The key difference between the final
version of the CIIA FOIA provision and the compromise provision is
that the compromise merely provided a FOIA exemption for
“records,” whereas the final version protects the broader category of
110
“information.”
The Senators recognized that the “information”
standard is vague and could be exploited simply by reference to
111
private sector information contained in a government record.
Moreover, the compromise would have limited the exemption to
records pertaining to “the vulnerability of and threats to critical
infrastructure,” rather than the CIIA’s broader language requiring

(reporting that the American Petroleum Institute “believes that making public
security-sensitive information is a potential threat to refineries, pipelines, and
offshore facilities,” and thus supports the new FOIA exemption).
106. See Backes, supra note 38, at 978 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Nat’l
Aeronautics & Space Admin., 895 F. Supp. 319, 326 (D.D.C. 1995), Critical Mass
Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(en banc), and Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Research & Dev. Ctr. v. Brown, 443 F.
Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. Va. 1977)).
107. See Backes, supra note 38, at 978 (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879).
108. See id. (citing Westinghouse, 443 F. Supp. at 1228-29).
109. This compromise was offered and approved unanimously during the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee markup on the bill. Amendment to Scale Back FOIA
Exemption for Homeland Security Department (July 25, 2002) [hereinafter Amendment], at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/07/leahy-foi.html (on file with the American
University Law Review). See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89 at S11425 (asserting
that the enacted version “jettisoned the bipartisan compromise” and “replaced it with
a big-business wish-list gussied up in security garb”).
110. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425 (arguing that by using the
term “records” rather than “information,” the government would avoid the “adverse
result of government agency-created and generated documents and databases being
put off-limits . . . simply if private sector ‘information’ is incorporated”).
111. Amendment, supra note 109.

UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC

2003]

2/23/2004 2:22 PM

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

281
112

protection of any “critical infrastructure information.”
After all,
under the CIIA, any document labeled as containing “critical
infrastructure information” would be off-limits to the public.
113
Following FOIA legal precedent, the compromise legislation also
ensured that those portions of records that do not fall within a
specific FOIA exemption would still be disclosed to FOIA
114
requesters.
Finally, the compromise legislation did not exempt
industry from civil or antitrust liability, did not preempt state and
local freedom of information laws, and only applied to records
115
submitted to DHS.
This compromise was all but ignored in
November 2002, perhaps due to the Republicans’ enhanced clout
116
following the November midterm elections. Though they differed
in their respective approaches, both the CIIA FOIA provision and the
Senate compromise provision focused on critical infrastructure
protection because our nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure is a
potential target for future terrorist attacks.
1.

Critical infrastructure protection
117
Just as the U.S. economy was a target on September 11, 2001, it is
a foregone conclusion that terrorists will continue to target our
118
nation’s critical infrastructure. This places the U.S. government in
a precarious position, as estimates indicate that up to ninety percent
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. See generally Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (holding that
agencies may disclose nonsecret factual portions of protected records).
114. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89.
115. Amendment, supra note 109.
116. See Eleanor Clift, Capitol Letter: The Latest Debacle, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2002
(arguing that the Bush Administration used its “post-election muscle . . . to extend a
blanket of secrecy over government business that has even a tangential link to
homeland security”), available at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/838892.asp (on file
with the American University Law Review). Clift argues that the DHS FOIA provision
passed “with nobody paying attention and the Democrats demoralized.” Id.
117. See Ross Kerber, Send in the Cyber G-Men: Private Sector Urged to Partner in
Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2001, at C1 (citing a report by Dartmouth’s Institute
for Security Technology Studies as stating that the September 11, 2001 attacks closed
financial markets and “destroyed a significant component of the financial
information infrastructure in New York City”); see also Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Who’s in Charge?: Hearing of the S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 4 (2001)
(statement of Sen. Carnahan, Member, S. Governmental Affairs Comm.) (asserting
that the September 11, 2001 terrorists not only wanted to bring down our buildings,
but to injure our economy, our military, and our “financial and political
infrastructure”).
118. Basically, the definition of “infrastructure covers just about everything of
value in our country.” See Statement of Cleland, supra note 79 (noting that
“[n]othing affects Americans more than the disruption of the Nation’s
[infrastructure]”). Our nation’s infrastructure sectors are increasingly becoming
interdependent, so disruptions in one sector could ultimately have repercussions
across many sectors. Id.
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of the nation’s critical infrastructure industries are privately owned
119
and independently operated, and many of them remain vulnerable
120
Many government insiders believe that the new CIIA
to attack.
FOIA exemption will encourage these industries to share sensitive
information with the government and ultimately lead to public121
private cooperation in the “war against terrorism.”
However, this
Comment will later demonstrate that even with this broad new
exemption, critical infrastructure owners and operators might
continue to withhold sensitive information due to trust and
uncertainty issues surrounding potential partnerships with the
122
government.
2.

The likelihood of cyber attacks
The CIIA FOIA provision addresses not only conventional attacks
on the nation’s physical critical infrastructure, but also
unconventional attacks on our nation’s computer information and
123
Key
sectors
such
as
communication
infrastructure.
telecommunications, power distribution, water supply, public health
services, national defense, and emergency services all depend upon

119. See Statement of Davis, supra note 9 (emphasizing that although sensitive
critical infrastructure information is now shared within some industries, such
information is not shared with the government or shared across industries); see also
Exec. Order. No. 13,231, 3 C.F.R. 806 (2002), reprinted in 6 U.S.C. § 121 (2002)
(implementing a critical infrastructure protection program composed of a “voluntary
public-private
partnership,
involving
corporate
and
nongovernmental
organizations.”).
120. See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 7, at 26 (reporting that much of
our critical infrastructure is as vulnerable to attack today as it was a year ago); see also
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Who’s In Charge?: Hearing of the S. Governmental Affairs
Comm., 107th Cong. 28 (2001) (statement of Frank Cilluffo, Senior Policy Analyst
and Deputy Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies) [hereinafter
Statement of Cilluffo] (arguing that the nation’s infrastructure is a “popular terrorist
target” and that the “destruction or incapacitation [of these systems] could have a
debilitating effect on U.S. national or economic security”).
121. See NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at 26 (reporting that the CIIA assists in removing
legal obstacles to public-private information sharing).
122. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing cultural problems such as industry
distrust and uncertainty as obstacles to public-private information sharing).
123. This has significant import because “[c]omputers power the economy.” See
Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities to
Critical Infrastructures in a Networked World, 58 BUS. LAW. 349, 350 (2002) (quoting
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice as stating that “the cyber economy is the
economy” in her Address to the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 23, 2001)), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/security.pdf) (on file with the American University Law Review). See generally Eric Talbot
Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the
Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207 (2002) (arguing that cyber attacks
targeting the nation’s critical infrastructure are an act of aggression and allow the
victim state to act in anticipatory self-defense).
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124

networked operations.
Experts warn that our population’s
125
increased reliance on computer networks could ultimately pose a
126
new threat of cyber attacks. Frighteningly, just one successful cyber
attack has the potential to cause widespread damage and result in
127
thousands of deaths.
As enumerated by counter-terrorism adviser
124. Tim Hackman, director of public affairs for International Business Machines
Corp.’s government programs, argued that “[c]yber-security and electronic
infrastructure are such a pervasive foundation of everything in our country that we
need to raise the focus of that in the [DHS] legislation.” Ariana Eunjung Cha, CyberSecurity is Underplayed, Industry Says, WASH. POST, July 4, 2002, at E01.
125. See Creating the Department of Homeland Security:
Consideration of the
Administration’s Proposal Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation of
the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 335 (2002) (statement of Robert
F. Dacey, Director, GAO) [hereinafter Statement of Dacey] (arguing that
“widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to our computer systems and . . .
the critical operations and infrastructures they support”); see also Statement of
Bennett, supra note 103 (stating that pipelines can be controlled remotely by
computers, and that a weakness in a telecommunications system could affect both
the functioning of the military and the financial services sector).
126. Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure
Protection and Counterterrorism within the National Security Counsel and currently
President Bush’s special advisor on cyberspace security, cautioned that terrorists
could attack the U.S. through cyber attacks, consisting of attacks on the nation’s
infrastructure “not from bombs but with computers.” See Jensen, supra note 123, at
211 (quoting Richard Clarke, Keynote Address: Threats to U.S. National Security:
Proposed Partnership Initiatives Toward Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL BUS.
L.J. 33, 35 (1999)). Clark posed the frightening prospect that the U.S. may
experience an “electronic Pearl Harbor,” when concurrent cyber attacks could
disable cities’ power, telecommunications, and transportation. Id. at 212 (quoting
Clarke, supra, at 38). See also Kerber, supra note 117 (reporting that security planners
have noted that past military actions “prompted a response from hackers
worldwide”).
127. See Matthews, supra note 101, at 12 (reporting the remarks of Rep. Lamar
Smith to a group of technology industry insiders and congressional staffers). As an
example of just how vulnerable our computer networks may be, see Jensen, supra
note 123, at 209, in which the author describes an October 2000 computer hack at
the Microsoft Corporation. The hackers may have accessed Microsoft’s software
source code using a relatively unsophisticated program (called a Trojan horse),
giving them the ability to either alter program operations or install hacker tools into
the software. Id. at 210 (citing ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE ET AL., CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
& INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CYBER THREATS AND INFORMATION SECURITY MEETING THE
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE iv (2000), available at http://www.csis.org/homeland/
reports/cyberthreatsandinfosec.pdf) (on file with the American University Law
Review). Although Microsoft denied any serious damage, see id. at 209 (citing Dan
Verton, Think Tank Warns That Microsoft Hack Could Pose National Security Risk,
COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 2000, available at http://www.computerworld.com/security
topics/security/story/0,10801,55656,00.html) (on file with the American University
Law Review), a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (“CSIS”)
argued that “if this could happen to Microsoft, then no company is safe.” See id.
(citing BORCHGRAVE ET AL., supra). The CSIS report further argued that if someone
can hack into the “heart of the ubiquitous Windows program [they] can hack into
any PC in the world that uses it and is connected to the Internet.” Jensen, supra note
123, at 210 (citing BORCHGRAVE ET AL., supra, at iv). Some notorious hacking cases
remain unsolved. See Kerber, supra note 117 (citing attacks that shut down Yahoo
Inc. and E*Trade in February 2000). Criminals continue to take advantage of
weaknesses in computer networks. Recently, Federal authorities charged three men
in the largest identity theft case to date, in which the perpetrators allegedly obtained
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James Kallstrom at a House hearing, the potential cyber attack
scenarios are frightening: air traffic control equipment malfunctions,
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems modified to
circulate harmful gases within a large office complex, 911 telephone
communications interrupted, electrical blackouts, power dam water
flow modified to allow downstream flooding, and financial market
128
disruption.
Through use of the Internet, cyber terrorists could
129
carry out all of these attacks at once.
Indeed, terrorists may soon use the Internet as a “direct instrument
130
of bloodshed.” Thus far, no traditional terrorist groups have used
131
the Internet to attack our critical infrastructure. However, evidence
indicates that members of al Qaeda have researched the possibility of
electronically disabling or destroying our nation’s critical
132
infrastructure, including dams and communications systems.
In a

network access codes to credit reports and defrauded some 30,000 individuals. Feds
Charge 3 in Massive Credit Fraud Scheme, CNN, Nov. 25, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/25/ID.theft/index.html (on file with the
American University Law Review).
The alleged criminals deleted the victims’ bank accounts, ordered new checks,
ATM cards, and credit cards using the victims’ identities, and opened new lines of
credit, only to immediately disburse the funds. Id.
128. See Statement of Kallstrom, supra note 10 (arguing that technology can be
used as a weapon of mass destruction).
129. See Statement of Cilluffo, supra note 120, at 27 (stating that “[T]he
comparatively low-tech means employed by the terrorists raises the possibility of a
cyber strike,” or even a combination of physical and virtual attacks on one or more
critical infrastructures).
130. See Creating the Department of Homeland Security:
Consideration of the
Administration’s Proposal Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation of
the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 226 (2002) (statement of Guy
Copeland, Vice President, Computer Sciences Corporation) [hereinafter Statement
of Copeland] (citing evidence of al Qaeda’s internet skills and interest in using
computers to launch an attack against physical structures).
131. Statement of Dacey, supra note 125.
132. See, e.g., id. (stating that officials discovered information on computerized
water systems in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan); Jay Lyman, Worries Mount Over
Terrorist Cyber Assault, NEWSFACTOR NETWORK, June 27, 2002 (realizing that al Qaeda
may posses working knowledge of vital infrastructure systems), available at
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/18426.html (on file with the American
University Law Review); see also Brett Stohs, Protecting the Homeland by Exemption: Why
the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Will Degrade the Freedom of Information
Act, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2002) (noting that “one of the hottest perceived
threats to America” is “cyberterror” using our electronic infrastructure). Moreover,
key al Qaeda members have shown a high degree of technical proficiency regarding
computer systems. Kerber, supra note 117. For example, investigators found that
Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
encrypted details of other attack plans on his laptop computer. Id. Investigators also
discovered an al Qaeda hideout in Pakistan that was used solely for the purpose of
training operatives in cyber warfare and hacking. See also Frye, supra note 123 (citing
Kelli Arena & David Ensor, U.S. Infrastructure Information Found on Al Qaeda Computers
(June 27, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/06/27/alqaeda.cyber.threat/
index.html (on file with the American University Law Review)).
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briefing for members of Congress on July 23, 2002, Representative
Lamar Smith warned that there is a fifty percent chance that the next
al Qaeda terrorist strike against the U.S. will somehow involve a cyber
133
attack. Therefore, determining how to secure cyberspace is critical
to our national security, especially considering this country’s
134
dependence on computer networks.
The federal government used the U.S.’s apparent vulnerabilities in
our physical and electronic infrastructure to justify legislation and
policies that could undermine FOIA. However, the preexisting FOIA
exemption framework provides the government with adequate tools
to protect critical infrastructure information, thus obviating the need
for this erosion of FOIA.
IV. DISCUSSION: THE UNNECESSARY EROSION OF FOIA AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY, PUBLIC SAFETY
AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING PARTNERSHIPS
A. The Bush Administration’s Policy Shift Takes a Broad Step Toward
Restricting Public Access to Government Information
As described above, the Ashcroft Memorandum effectively requires
135
the public to have a “need to know” the information it requests, the
same legal standard that existed prior to the enactment of FOIA in
136
1966. Such a high standard of proof on the part of the requesters
133. See Matthews, supra note 101, at 12. Representative Smith, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee’s Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
Subcommittee, warned that there is evidence that al Qaeda operatives have searched
U.S. websites and researched the country’s electronic infrastructure to find ways to
“disable power and water supplies, disrupt phone service and damage other parts of
the infrastructure.” Id. He particularly cautioned that al Qaeda members might
attempt to disable California’s energy network. Id.
134. See Cha, supra note 124, at E01 (discussing the need for cyber-security
provisions in the HSA); see also Statement of Davis, supra note 9, at H5826 (arguing
that the “vulnerabilities to attack on Federal information systems [have] grown
exponentially,” and that the “high degree of dependence between information
systems . . . exposes the Federal Government’s computer networks to benign and
destructive disruptions”).
135. See discussion supra Part II.C (describing how Attorney General Ashcroft
contributed to the Bush Administration’s FOIA policy); see also Tom Beierle & Ruth
Greenspan Bell, Don’t Let ‘Right to Know’ be a War Casualty, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 20, 2001, at 9; see Parker, supra note 3 (quoting Gary Bass, executive director of
OMB Watch, as stating that “[w]e seem to be shifting to the public’s need to know
instead of the public’s right to know”).
Analysts believe that the Bush
Administration’s clampdown on government disclosure “stands out in part because it
follows a decade in which . . . improving technology [made] government more
accessible to Americans.” Id. One may naturally draw the conclusion that such an
environment reinforced the public’s “right to know” certain government
information.
136. See GAO, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining how the enactment of FOIA, with its
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could give agencies a green light to restrict access to government
information—a result that could ultimately diminish the American
public’s legal right of free and open access to government
137
information.
Further, Attorney General Ashcroft guarantees that DOJ will
defend agency actions so long as it finds a “sound legal basis” for the
138
agency’s reasoning. In turn, this could overwhelm the federal court
system if the public feels it has not been afforded an appropriate
139
DOJ officials argue that Attorney General
administrative remedy.
Reno’s FOIA memorandum “raised the bar for FOIA refusals,” and
that Attorney General Ashcroft’s FOIA memorandum simply reverts
to the standard that had existed prior to the Clinton
140
Administration.
Regardless, this new standard for litigating FOIA
cases in light of heightened threats to national security could indicate
that the DOJ is “less committed to open government” post-September
141
11, 2001.
“right to know” standard, supplanted the previous “need to know” basis governing
access to government information).
137. See Summerill, supra note 37, at 28 (arguing that “[c]itizens of a democratic
society deserve disclosure of government records to ensure government
accountability”); see also Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 141 (arguing that the
Ashcroft Memo’s “‘sound legal basis’ standard is much more slanted toward
withholding” government records from FOIA disclosure than the Reno Memo’s
“foreseeable harm” standard).
138. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 60.
139. See Vanessa Blum, Administration Won One FOIA Fight, But Battle is Far From
Over, THE RECORDER, Dec. 16, 2002 (reporting on FOIA challenges in our nation’s
courtrooms and quoting Natural Resources Defense Council general counsel Sharon
Buccino as saying that “the White House is not off the hook” when it comes to FOIA
disclosures). Another industry insider, Georgetown University Law Center professor
and former litigation director of Public Citizen, David Vladeck, commented that DOJ
was ordered by the White House “to litigate these cases aggressively” and that the
new battle for information in the courtrooms is “absolute trench warfare.” Id.
140. Id. (reporting a joke by David Sobel, general counsel of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, that “even under Reno, he never had a case in which the Justice
Department refused to represent an agency”). But see James V. Grimaldi, At Justice,
Freedom Not to Release Information, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2002, at E01 (arguing that “[i]t
is not that the Reno Justice Department was particularly enamored with FOIA. But at
least attorneys didn’t have carte blanche to disregard the law.”).
141. See Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 1124 (citing Beierle & Bell, supra note 135, at
9; On the Public’s Right to Know: The Day Ashcroft Censored Freedom of Information, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 6, 2002, at D4; Ashcroft sends chilling message to FOIA: Memo urging caution
over freedom of information requests needs to be reviewed, VENTURA CITY STAR, Jan. 11, 2002,
at B6; and Helen Thomas, President Bush and John Ashcroft Trample the Bill of Rights,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 16, 2001, at B6); see also Department of Justice
Oversight: Preserving our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 310-14 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, U.S.
Attorney General) (outlining the Bush Administration’s tactics in fighting terrorism
and defending the Administration’s decision to keep confidential information that
might impede the government’s national security efforts), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.
htm (on file with the American University Law Review); Beierle & Bell, supra note
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The Bush Administration memoranda encouraged the protection
of sensitive information through use of FOIA’s statutory
142
exemptions. Although the ultimate result of the Ashcroft and Card
memoranda appears to be a reduction in the amount of government
143
information available to the public, the memoranda are important
because they suggested ways to work within FOIA’s preexisting
144
145
statutory framework, using Exemptions 2
and 4
to protect
146
Despite efforts to encourage the protection
sensitive information.
of sensitive information using this framework, private industry
remains reluctant to share sensitive information with the
government. Many critical infrastructure owners and operators
believe the preexisting FOIA exemptions do not provide adequate
disclosure protections and could open industry to potential liability.

135, at 9 (asserting that the presumption in the Bush Administration is that
information is inherently risky).
142. See Kimberly Memorandum, supra note 69 (instructing agencies to protect
sensitive critical infrastructure information under Exemption 2 (5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(2)), and to protect private sector information voluntarily submitted to the
Government under Exemption 4 (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4))).
143. See Tapscott, supra note 64 (reporting that the Pentagon removed
approximately 6,000 Department of Defense documents from disclosure in
compliance with the Card Memorandum, and lamenting that now no one “outside of
government can verify that any of those documents contained information that could
help terrorists”); see also PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, ONE YEAR LATER:
SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE INTERNET 8, 9 (2002) (providing an extensive listing of website
information to which government agencies prevented access post-September 11,
2001, including the removal of information relating to nuclear facilities from the
Department of Energy website, the removal of a security report for chemical plants
from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry website, and the denial of
access to the National Pipeline Mapping System on the Department of
Transportation website), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/
PIP_9-11_Report.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). The Pew
study reported that the Card and Ashcroft memoranda resulted in the removal of
documents from government websites, as well as terminating certain websites in their
entirety. Id. The Department of Energy completely removed the website for the
National Transportation of Radioactive Materials from the Internet. Id. at 9. A Pew
survey from June 26, 2002, to July 26, 2002, found that only twenty-five percent of the
public was aware that the government had sealed off access to some of its sensitive
websites. Id.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2002) (exempting “internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency”).
145. Id. § 552(b)(4) (exempting “trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”).
146. Similarly, the White House’s National Strategy for Homeland Security also
provides a framework for working within the preexisting exemption framework to
address national security concerns. See NSHS, supra note 10, at 56 (citing FOIA’s
exemption framework as protecting sensitive information when its disclosure could
harm the public interest or frustrate national security efforts). The document
advocates “narrowly limiting public disclosure” of sensitive information so as not to
compromise principles of transparency and government accountability. Id. at 48.
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B. Private Industry is Reluctant to Enter Into Public-Private Information
Sharing Partnerships Without Protections to Ensure the Integrity of its
Sensitive Business Data
Private industry faces a significant challenge in protecting its assets
147
The government neither owns nor operates the
from attack.
majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure. As a result, private
industry must provide the first line of defense to protect its own
148
149
systems.
This entails increased investments in security spending.
Complicating this task, industry is also in the midst of coping with the
150
consequences of an economic downturn.
Some critical
infrastructure owners and operators are now forced to focus on
remaining in business. Protecting their companies from potential
151
terrorist attacks may be a secondary priority.
While private industry struggles to stay in business, the government
seeks cooperation to fortify protection of the nation’s critical
152
infrastructures.
Industry could benefit from this interaction: in
exchange for providing information to the government concerning
infrastructure vulnerabilities, the government could provide industry
with advice in making security investment decisions, assistance if the
“threat at hand exceeds [industry’s] capability to protect itself,” and
“timely warning” and assurances that the government would focus on
the protection of those infrastructures that face a “specific, imminent
153
threat.”

147. See generally NSPPCIKA, supra note 6 (describing the financing and high
degree of effort industry must put forth in order to protect its infrastructures).
148. Id. In many cases, private firms possess better technical expertise and more
adequate means to protect “the infrastructure they control” than the government.
NSHS, supra note 10, at 33. Still, industry faces many challenges in this new threat
environment. See NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing that although critical
infrastructure owners and operators have always been responsible for protecting
their systems, this framework was not designed to cope with significant terrorist
threats or the ensuing economic or psychological fallout).
149. Id. at 20.
150. Id. at 22.
151. Id. Supporting this assertion, the Brookings Institution argues that private
markets do not adequately protect against terrorist attacks because businesspersons
tend to focus more on the pursuit of profit than the possibility that their facilities
could come under attack. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, PROTECTING THE AMERICAN
HOMELAND: ONE YEAR ON 80-82 (2003).
152. See THE PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, THE NSTAC’S RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL PLAN (2001) [hereinafter
NSTAC RESPONSE] (reporting that while the government focuses on shoring up
national security, private infrastructure owners and operators focus more on
“common business imperatives”), available at http://www.ncs.gov/NSTAC/National
PlanReport-Final.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
153. NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at xi.
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Despite these potential benefits, industry is still reluctant to share
sensitive business information with the government due to concerns
that FOIA requests could lead to public disclosure of those
communications, opening up the possibility of antitrust and other
154
potential liability.
Overall, private industry articulates two major
concerns about communicating vulnerabilities to the federal
government: first, a risk that this information would become public
through the country’s disclosure laws, resulting in a loss of
proprietary information and an increased liability, and second, the
potential for antitrust and other legal action against cooperating
155
companies.
Industry insiders argue that “information sharing is a risky
156
proposition with less than clear benefits.”
Purported uncertainty
about current disclosure laws leads companies to avoid the potential
risk that such sensitive information could ultimately become public
157
through FOIA and similar state statutes.
Industry groups thus
154. See NSHS, supra note 10, at 33. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INFORMATION SHARING: PRACTICES THAT CAN BENEFIT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION 7 (2001) [hereinafter GAO IS] (detailing industry’s concerns that
release of this type of sensitive information could have damaging effects including
lowering customer confidence and providing advantages to competitors).
155. See Frye, supra note 123, at 361 (reporting that at least two major industry
organizations, the Information Technology Association of America and the
Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security, have raised these concerns). John
Tritak, Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office within the U.S.
Department of Commerce, testified that industry has long voiced these concerns,
and that industry’s uncertainty regarding FOIA’s legal framework is a “key
impediment” to information sharing. Securing Our Infrastructure: Private/Public
Information Sharing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong.
79 (2002) (statement of John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance
Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter Statement of Tritak].
156. See Securing Our Infrastructure: Private/Public Information Sharing: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 97-98 (2002) (statement of Harris
N. Miller, President, Information Technology Association of America) [hereinafter
Statement of Miller] (elaborating that no company would want sensitive, and
potentially damaging, information to be made public—especially when it could
“jeopardize [that company’s] market position” and investor confidence); see also
Dorobek, supra note 100, at 12 (discussing industry’s continued hesitance regarding
FOIA). Stanley Jarocki, Chairman of a Financial Services Information Sharing and
Analysis Center and Vice President of Information Technology Security for Morgan
Stanley, commented that many companies are wary of the risks of sharing this type of
critical information. Id.
Ronald Dick, director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, asserted that industry
believes that the law on FOIA exemptions is unclear. Id. In contrast, Representative
Janice Schakowsky, ranking member of the House Government Reform Committee’s
Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations
Subcommittee, finds it “shocking” that industry would be reluctant to share
information that could prove critical for homeland security. Id. Representative
Schakowsky argued that Congress should not keep this information secret simply
because businesses prefer that result. Id.
157. Statement of Miller, supra note 156; see also Statement of Tritak, supra note
155 (arguing that so long as companies perceive the potential for FOIA disclosure of
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argue that FOIA disclosures must be restricted to ensure the free flow
of information to the government without fear of reprisal or public
158
Industry insiders point to antitrust concerns as another
scrutiny.
legal obstacle to information sharing, because “[t]he antitrust laws
159
focus on sharing information concerning commercial activities,”
which could be implicated by public-private cooperation.
With these concerns in mind, the CIIA FOIA provision responds to
the fear that critical infrastructure owners and operators would not
comply voluntarily with the government’s information requests
160
without new disclosure protections.
Moreover, the CIIA FOIA
provision addresses industry’s other liability concerns by providing
for the legal immunity of infrastructure owners and operators who
voluntarily provide infrastructure data, and by imposing criminal
penalties upon those government officials who disclose this
161
information. Although it remains to be seen whether industry will
view these new protections as an incentive to share sensitive
information with the government, current FOIA law indicates that
the preexisting exemption framework already protects from
disclosure this type of critical infrastructure information.
C. The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Contains an Overly
Broad and Unnecessary FOIA Exemption
Industry’s concerns about public disclosure of sensitive
162
information seem credible initially because FOIA is a disclosure
sensitive documents, a “common sense risk assessment” leans toward nondisclosure).
Scott Charney, Chief Security Strategist for Microsoft Corp., argued that many
companies feel the preexisting exemption framework provided “hazy definitions,”
and could perhaps lead to “endless litigation.” Krebs, supra note 103. Charney made
this argument in support of a broad, concrete FOIA exemption for the DHS. Id. See
generally THE PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, INFORMATION SHARING/CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION TASK
FORCE REPORT C-1–C-17 (2000) [hereinafter NSTAC TASK FORCE REPORT] (analyzing
industry perspectives on FOIA and listing different information sharing initiatives’
potential exposure to disclosure laws), available at http://www.ncs.gov/NSTAC/NST
ACXXIII/Reports/ISCIP-Final.pdf (on file with the American University Law
Review).
158. GAO IS, supra note 154, at 16; Samuelsohn, supra note 105; see Statement of
Miller, supra note 156 (contending that the government unfairly expects private
industry to share sensitive information without any “ironclad assurances of
confidentiality”).
159. Statement of Miller, supra note 156; see Statement of Tritak, supra note 155.
160. Additionally, official government sources, such as the White House’s National
Strategy for Homeland Security, declare that private firms should be assured that “good
faith disclosures about vulnerabilities and preparedness do not expose the firm to
liability . . . .” NSHS, supra note 10, at 33.
161. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. §§ 214(a)(1)(C), (f)
(2002).
162. See, e.g., Statement of Copeland, supra note 130 (pinpointing uncertainty and
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law. Courts hold that FOIA should be “broadly construed in favor
of disclosure,” and that the nine statutory exemptions should be
164
Moreover, FOIA is “generally one-sided [in]
narrowly construed.
nature”: while a requester who is denied access to government
information may file a complaint in a U.S. District Court to enjoin
165
agency disclosure, FOIA typically does not allow private entities to
166
enjoin an agency from disclosure.
Although these factors cause
167
industry to fear FOIA disclosure of sensitive business information, a
168
clarification of the law, rather than a new blanket exemption that
broadens the scope of FOIA’s preexisting statutory exemptions,
should quiet industry’s concerns.
1.

The CIIA FOIA exemption expands the breadth of preexisting
statutory exemptions that already protect infrastructure data
FOIA’s preexisting exemption framework protects adequately the
169
Specifically, four of the statutory
integrity of sensitive data.
exemptions already in place could protect against the release of
170
171
critical infrastructure information:
1. Classified Information;

high levels of risk as reasons why industry is reluctant to voluntarily share critical
infrastructure information with the government, and arguing that “corporations
should not be required to accept such risks . . . in an attempt to protect the public
interest”).
163. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 10 (citing Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users
Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 7 (2001)); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 861 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that disclosure under FOIA is the rule
and secrecy is the exception).
164. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 10 (citing Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1990), and Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v.
Block, 755 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir. 1985)).
165. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 11 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)).
166. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316
(1979)). However, an exception may apply to information falling under Exemption
4. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing “reverse-FOIA” suits).
167. See Statement of Kallstrom, supra note 10 (arguing that the private sector
refuses to share sensitive information with the government because of “well-founded
fears” that it will ultimately be disclosed under FOIA). But see Stohs, supra note 132,
¶ 14 (arguing that private sector fears are overstated and that industry’s concerns
should not bar disclosure of critical infrastructure information).
168. See Statement of Tritak, supra note 155 (arguing that industry must be
presented with “clear, well-defined rules,” and that the absence of such a clarification
could place our nation at risk).
169. See generally Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2 (providing evidence that
exemptions 1 through 4 could protect adequately sensitive critical infrastructure
data). The Gidiere & Forrester article was one of the first post-September 11, 2001
efforts to assess the possibility of safeguarding sensitive national security information
under FOIA’s preexisting exemption framework.
170. See id. at 139 (arguing that there are ways to work within the confines of the
current exemptions to address recent security concerns).
171. Id. at 141. “Exemption 1 protects information classified pursuant to an
applicable executive order.” Id.
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2. Internal Agency Procedures;
3. Information Exempted by
173
174
Statute; and 4. Confidential Business Information. Of these four
exemptions, Exemptions 1 and 4 would appear to be the most
effective preexisting exemptions to secure the integrity of critical
infrastructure data. Used in conjunction, these exemptions should
provide the courts with tools to protect sensitive infrastructure
information, thus eliminating the need for the broad new DHS
exemption.
Exemption 1, the “oldest and most well-established ground for
175
withholding government information,” provides for the protection
of documents that are “specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified
176
pursuant to such Executive Order.”
Courts rely heavily upon an

172. Exemption 2 “applies to information ‘related solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency.’” Id. at 142 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2002)).
In the wake of September 11, 2001, DOJ’s Office of Information and Privacy
supported agency use of this exemption to protect critical infrastructure
information. See id. at 143 (arguing that while this exemption could be used to justify
withholding homeland security information that originated within the agencies, it
may not protect records submitted “by a private entity regarding nonagency assets”).
173. “Exemption 3 protects information ‘specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute . . . provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from
the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld.’” See id. at 145 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) and reporting that the Critical
Infrastructure Information Security Act of 2001, S. 1456, was a Senate “attempt to use
Exemption 3 to protect certain homeland security information”).
174. “Exemption 4 of FOIA exempts from disclosure ‘trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential.’” See Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 143 (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4) and arguing that Exemption 4 appears to protect critical infrastructure
information submitted by private industry regarding vulnerabilities). Gidiere and
Forrester base their analysis on cases that find that information voluntarily submitted
to the government would receive Exemption 4 protection if it is the type of
information that “would customarily not be released to the public by the person
from whom it was obtained.” Id. (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975
F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Gidiere and Forrester reason that information that
is voluntarily submitted “is not the type of information that would be ‘customarily
released’ by the business.” Id. at 143. Importantly, this standard for voluntarily
submitted business information has not been adopted by all federal circuits. Id. It
appears that by enforcing this standard, courts would eliminate the need for the
broad DHS exemption to protect private industry. See id. at 145 (arguing that
perhaps the federal circuits should adopt the Critical Mass test for voluntarily
submitted business information in order to clarify the law protecting “certain
homeland security information”).
175. See Faust, supra note 21, at 617 (citing 1 J. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE 4-11, 11-1 (1983)). Incidentally, FOIA supporters often criticize the use
of Exemption 1 to restrict public access to such a magnitude of data. See id. at 617
(citing O’Reilly, supra note 175, at 11-2).
176. A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, supra note 33, at 64.
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agency’s affidavit concerning its Exemption 1 classifications.
As a
result, FOIA litigation rarely results in judicial compulsion to disclose
178
Therefore, the use of Exemption 1 should
classified records.
protect from disclosure classified records pertaining to critical
179
infrastructure.
Cases suggest that Exemption 4, which applies to “‘trade secrets’
and to ‘commercial or financial information obtained from a person
180
and privileged or confidential,’”
already protects critical
181
infrastructure information. In Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear
182
Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit held that the purpose of
Exemption 4 is to encourage cooperation between the government
183
and companies with useful information. This purpose is the same
184
goal as the FOIA provision in the CIIA. Indeed, agencies safeguard
the confidentiality of critical infrastructure information using
185
186
Exemption 4, including power plant safety reports and design
187
drawings of airplane parts.
Exemption 4 even contains a unique
provision to protect companies against agency release of information:
private companies submitting sensitive information to the
government can bring a “reverse-FOIA” suit seeking to enjoin
188
disclosure under the Administrative Procedure Act.
This power
could provide industry the sense of security it needs to share its
proprietary records.
177. Id. See generally Faust, supra note 21 (emphasizing the need for effective
judicial review of Exemption 1 withholdings in case agencies make improper
disclosure decisions).
178. See Faust, supra note 21, at 629 (citing 128 CONG. REC. S4211 (daily ed. Apr.
28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger)).
179. See Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 141 (arguing that the current
Executive Order protecting critical infrastructure (Executive Order 12958) would
likely cover homeland security information, especially when considered in
conjunction with other exemptions); see also Kimberly, supra note 69 (providing for
classification of sensitive government information under Executive Order 12958);
supra note 96 (implementing Executive Order 12958 for DHS).
180. A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, supra note 33, at 65.
181. Summerill, supra note 37, at 28.
182. 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 878.
184. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 13; see Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 143
(describing Exemption 4 as protecting “infrastructure information” voluntarily
submitted to the government by private industry).
185. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89 (referring to the exemption for financial
or commercial information (Exemption 4) and citing Critical Mass Energy Project v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
186. See id. (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 874).
187. See id. (citing United Tech. Corp. v. F.A.A., 102 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996)).
188. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 12 n.36 (citing the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2002) which suggests that “agency actions will only be
overturned if found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law”).
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Aside from mere redundancy, the CIIA FOIA exemption actually
goes beyond the scope of the nine statutory exemptions in restricting
access to government data. The CIIA’s FOIA language is so broad
that it could be construed to protect information that would not
189
otherwise be exempt from disclosure.
In a minority opinion, four
of the nine members of the House Select Committee on Homeland
Security expressed concerns that the broad definitions of critical
infrastructure and voluntary submission could cover corporations
seeking liability protection, such as an energy company hiding
information about a leak at its nuclear power plant, simply by
190
voluntarily submitting infrastructure information to DHS.
Administrative law expert Jeffrey S. Lubbers provides one possible
solution to restrict this overly broad provision: amend the Act to
apply to “[i]nformation provided voluntarily by non-Federal entities
or individuals . . . to the extent that it relates to infrastructure
191
vulnerabilities.” This would at least follow FOIA legal precedent by
192
providing for the segregability of information not directly relating
193
to critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.
There are other indications that the CIIA FOIA provision actually
expands the preexisting exemption framework. First, the new DHS

189. See Robert Leger, New Congress Threatens Public Records: A GOP-Controlled
Legislature May Be Bad News for Open Government, THE QUILL, Dec. 2002, at 5 (arguing
that due to the Act’s broad definitions of critical infrastructure and voluntary
submission, DHS will “exempt many more documents than are withheld” currently
under Exemption 4).
190. H.R. REP. NO. 107-609, at 220 (2002). The House Select Committee on
Homeland Security minority view advocated for complete removal of the CIIA FOIA
provision, arguing that any new exemption is unnecessary and represents a retreat
from openness in government. Id. Critics worry that critical infrastructure owners
and operators “will be able to submit any information to the government regarding
previous attacks in order to become insulated against civil liability related to those
attacks.” See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 18 (asserting that while the DHS FOIA language
will encourage public-private partnerships, it will also inhibit the public’s ability to
use legal action to enforce industry accountability). In turn, this could decrease
private preparedness for future terrorist attacks—if industry knows it will be exempt
from civil liability “by simply submitting information regarding the attack” to DHS, it
may have “less of an economic incentive to invest in preventing future attacks.”
Id. ¶ 19.
191. Administrative Law, Adjudicatory Issues, and Privacy Ramifications of Creating a
Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin.
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Jeffrey S.
Lubbers, Fellow in Law and Government, Washington College of Law) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Statement of Lubbers]. This language is very similar to the
Leahy Compromise text. See Amendment, supra note 109 (limiting the DHS FOIA
exemption to records pertaining to “the vulnerability of and threats to critical
infrastructure”).
192. See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (holding that agencies
may disclose nonsecret factual portions of protected records).
193. See Statement of Lubbers, supra note 191.
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exemption supersedes state access laws. Congressman Mark Udall,
who voted in favor of the HSA, cited this provision as part of his
195
argument that the CIIA FOIA provision is “unnecessary.”
Moreover, the Administration’s encouragement of nondisclosure in
light of national security concerns could directly contradict
Congressional intent: Congress explicitly instructed in FOIA that for
national security purposes, “only information specifically exempted from
disclosure as national security information by executive determination may be
196
withheld from the public.”
Also troubling is the CIIA FOIA
provision allowing for the criminal prosecution of federal employees
197
who disclose this voluntarily submitted information. Finally, the
CIIA’s provision for rendering voluntarily submitted information “off
limits for any government regulatory action or civil lawsuit” expands
198
the breadth of the FOIA exemptions further than ever before. This
immunity provision could prove to be harmful to the public interest
and even endanger public safety.
2.

The CIIA FOIA exemption could harm public safety
Although critical infrastructure owners and operators argue that
they need this exemption to encourage them to share sensitive
199
information, industry’s concerns must be weighed against the
operating principles of FOIA and the public’s right to access this
information. Not only could the exemption undermine government
200
transparency by allowing the government to shield information
194. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(a)(1)(E)
(2002).
195. See 148 CONG. REC. E1506-02 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Udall) (arguing that the preemption of state access laws is an unnecessary harm
caused by the CIIA FOIA exemption when the preexisting exemption framework
“does not require the disclosure of national security information, sensitive law
enforcement information, or confidential business information”).
196. See Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 506 (emphasis added) (citing this possibility
as an example of how the Bush Administration is unjustly restricting the flow of
information to the requesting public and arguing that the current security threat
does not require a new legal regime).
197. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(f) (2002); see
Clift, supra note 116 (citing this provision as an example of how the DHS FOIA
provision chips away at FOIA and describing the provision as an indication that the
Republicans “went further than anybody imagined” in eroding FOIA).
198. See Leger, supra note 189 (arguing that the provision would expand beyond
Exemption 4 and cautioning that the ramification is that industry would be allowed
to “dump information about any mistakes, which would forever be hidden from the
public”).
199. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
200. See Thomas Blanton, The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POL’Y, July 1, 2002, at
50 (arguing that the concept of freedom of information and the attendant result of
transparency in government has evolved from “a moral indictment of secrecy to a
tool for market regulation . . . efficient government, and economic . . . growth”). But
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from public view, but this legislation could also needlessly risk public
201
safety. In Congressional debate, Senator Leahy posed the following
scenario: if DHS receives information from a biomedical laboratory
about a security vulnerability and anthrax is released subsequently
from the laboratory as a result of that vulnerability, DHS would not
be able to disclose under FOIA information relating to this security
vulnerability without first securing the laboratory’s consent to release
202
the information.
Moreover, due to the civil immunity guaranteed
203
by the CIIA, if a company submits information that its factory is
leaking arsenic into ground water, that information cannot be turned
over to local health authorities to use in any enforcement
proceeding, nor could the public access it through FOIA for use in a
204
civil tort action.
As enacted, the law could “‘tie the government’s hands’ by
precluding it from taking civil enforcement action against a company
by ‘direct use’ of information obtained through critical
205
infrastructure” reports. Therefore, Senator Leahy argued, the civil
immunity provided under the CIIA provides industry with a “perfect
blueprint” to avoid liability by allowing companies to feed damaging
information into the voluntary disclosure system, thus eliminating the
possibility for the government or others harmed by the company’s
206
actions to use that information against the company.
This result,
permissible under the CIIA, could endanger public safety rather than
see Moon, supra note 25, at 1167-68 (arguing that the principle of transparency in
government is a liberal construction).
201. See, e.g., Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11426 (emphasizing that the
DHS FOIA provision provides a broad FOIA exemption “without making any real
gains” in national security); Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 4 (arguing that the CIIA FOIA
exemption could threaten public access to vital public health and safety
information); Krebs, supra note 103 (quoting James X. Dempsey, deputy director for
the Center for Democracy and Technology, as arguing that private industry could
“shield vital health and safety information from the public, even if disclosure of the
information would pose no threat whatsoever”).
202. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425.
203. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(a)(1)(C)
(2002).
204. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425. For an elaborate set of
hypothetical scenarios illustrating potential consequences of the CIIA FOIA
exemption, see Steinzor, supra note 93, at 656-58 (discussing the potential
implications of the CIIA on transportation security, pollution, corporate fraud, and
various other threat scenarios).
205. See Dan Caterinicchia, Sharing Seen as Critical for Security, FED. COMPUTER WK.
(May 9, 2002) (quoting John Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), at
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2002/0506/web-crit-05-09-02.asp (on file with the
American University Law Review).
206. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425; see Caterinicchia, supra note
205 (quoting John Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, as stating that a
“company that was knowingly at fault” could “do a ‘document dump’ on the
government and basically absolve itself of future civil prosecution”).
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preserve it. Such a tactic would not require that company to address
the reported vulnerability. The ensuing lack of public accountability
207
could eliminate industry’s incentives to correct security problems.
Moreover, this tactic could also deprive the public of information on
208
how to protect itself from reported hazards.
The goal of the new exemption is clear: to encourage private
industry to share sensitive information with the government in order
to assist the government in preventing and responding to terrorist
threats. Yet the CIIA FOIA provision goes far beyond this goal,
containing language so broad that it creates the potential for abuse.
This is an unacceptable result when, in all likelihood, this broad
exemption will not secure private industry’s cooperation in publicprivate information sharing partnerships.
3.

Even with new protections, future prospects of public-private information
sharing remain uncertain
a.

Distrust and uncertainty continue to present obstacles to voluntary
information sharing

Although the Bush Administration aims to foster public-private
209
information sharing, establishing trusting relationships between the
210
public and private sectors remains a difficult task. The protections
207. See Steinzor, supra note 93, at 664. Steinzor’s article provides an extensive
analysis of the CIIA’s potential implications for corporate accountability and public
safety.
208. See id.
209. See NSHS, supra note 10, at 31 (declaring that the U.S. will facilitate an
“unprecedented level of cooperation . . . with private industry” in order to reduce the
nation’s vulnerability to terrorism); see also NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at vii (stating
that homeland security is a “shared responsibility” for the federal government, state
and local governments, and the private sector). Government and industry officials
alike agree that public-private information sharing will be necessary to protect the
homeland. See, e.g., Statement of Dacey, supra note 125 (arguing that information
sharing partnerships are necessary for developing approaches to defend against
cyber attacks); Statement of Miller, supra note 156 (stating that the Information
Technology Association of America, which represents information technology and
communications companies, supports the government’s goal of increasing publicprivate information sharing); Statement of Tritak, supra note 155, at 77 (arguing that
“infrastructure assurance can only be achieved by a voluntary public-private
partnership”); Caterinicchia, supra note 205 (reporting Senator Robert Bennett’s
statement that because the private sector and government are both targets, “they
should be talking to each other,” but that industry fears disclosed information could
be used against them).
210. See Critical Infrastructure Protection: Who’s In Charge?: Hearing of the S.
Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 23-24 (2001) (statement of Jamie S.
Gorelick, Vice Chairperson, Fannie Mae) (asserting that there is “a decided lack of
trust between industry and government”). Supporting this assertion, the Brookings
Institution argues that the intersection between the Federal government and the
private sector poses some of the country’s “most difficult homeland security
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offered by the CIIA are unlikely to eliminate the many obstacles to
211
Trust is critical to successful
voluntary information sharing.
212
partnerships, and industry officials argue that it can only be built
213
over time.
Thus, the government faces the challenge of initially
establishing and maintaining trust relationships as it scrambles to
214
shore up national security. As it stands, private industry is reluctant
to confirm security breaches due to “competitive pressure, fear of
215
regulations, and simple embarrassment.” This makes cooperation a
difficult endeavor, especially because such partnerships typically form
216
only in times of imminent crisis.

challenges.” See THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 8 (calling for new
public-private partnerships without imposing “undue economic costs” on private
industry); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY CAN DRAW ON YEAR 2000 EXPERIENCES 24 (Oct.
1999) [hereinafter GAO Y2K] (reporting that the task of establishing public-private
partnerships poses a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection).
211. See Caterinicchia, supra note 205 (quoting John Tritak, director of the Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office, as stating that “[p]eople expect too much of
legislation to fix a cultural problem”). Impediments to information sharing include
a lack of trust between private industry and government and industry’s reluctance to
share sensitive information due to concerns that public release of that information
could undermine customer confidence, open the floodgates to litigation, and harm
business in general. See GAO IS, supra note 154, at 7; see also discussion supra Part
IV.B (describing industry’s reluctance to share sensitive information with the
government and citing industry’s call for increased protections).
212. GAO IS, supra note 154, at 7. Along that vein, Tritak argues that while a
narrowly crafted FOIA exemption might facilitate information sharing, the critical
factor is still trust. See Statement of Tritak, supra note 155, at 77 (arguing that
achieving trust is “no small challenge”).
213. GAO IS, supra note 154, at 2.
214. See id. at 14-15 (arguing that the government should take steps to
institutionalize trust, rather than depend on personal relationships with separate
industries); see also Statement of Tritak, supra note 155, at 78 (stating that trust in any
voluntary information sharing relationship “requires a predictable and stable process
where the outcomes are certain”).
215. See Kerber, supra note 117 (discussing disincentives to information sharing,
while arguing for joint law enforcement and business cooperation in order to protect
critical infrastructure from would-be hackers and terrorists).
216. See id. (quoting John Woodward, Director of Information Warfare at Mitre
Corp.); see also Statement of Miller, supra note 156, at 95 (reporting that although
ninety percent of large corporations and government agencies responding to a 2002
FBI/Computer Security Institute Survey detected computer security breaches
between May 2001 and May 2002, only forty-four percent were “willing and/or able
to quantify their financial losses”); House Voting on Homeland Security with FOIA, Privacy
Provisions, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, July 19, 2002 (quoting Entrust C.E.O. William
Conner as stating that of the aforementioned ninety percent of private sector
companies, only thirty-four percent reported cyber attacks to law enforcement);
Krebs, supra note 103 (explaining that Alan Paller, director of research for the SANS
Institute, believes that most companies will continue to be reluctant to share
information on system vulnerabilities with the government, even with the newlyenacted FOIA exemption, because industry traditionally does not share such sensitive
critical information unless the recipient party could help solve the problem).
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Even with the CIIA FOIA exemption in place, industry must still
217
focus its efforts on staying in business. To meet the public interest
218
goal of public-private cooperation, companies would have to use
their valuable resources to develop proprietary information
219
regarding vulnerabilities.
This appears to be contrary to the
operational goals of profit-driven organizations, because it will not
220
increase short-term profits.
Information sharing between the public and private sectors is both
221
laudable and necessary, and many believe that a successful strategy
for homeland security depends on “the ability of all levels of
government and the private sector to communicate effectively with
222
one another.” Yet as it stands, the government could find its efforts
in the CIIA wasted without securing industry’s infrastructure
223
disclosures. Ineffective collaboration undermines efforts to protect
217. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing demands on industry to keep its
companies in business during tough economic times).
218. See Caterinicchia, supra note 205 (quoting John Tritak, director of the Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office, as stating that “[b]oth government and industry
realize that sharing information is ‘in the public interest’”).
219. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 20.
220. Id. (noting that “such investments may be hard to come by with the current
economic slowdown”); see, e.g., Frye, supra note 123, at 364 (arguing that because
“profit motivates all private sector activity; privately operated systems respond to
market motivators rather than public good”). For example, if a financial institution
faces a cyber attack, its profit-driven response should simply be to quickly stop the
attack: it would not be “cost-effective for businesses to invest in anything other than
stopping ‘the problem’ and just getting on with business.” See id. at 366 (quoting
DAVID KEYES, JOINT ECON. COMM. OF THE U.S. CONG., SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE:
NEW CHALLENGES, NEW STRATEGIES, 46 (2002), available at http://
www.house.gov/jec/security.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
Frye cites the notorious 1995 Citibank hacking, in which hackers stole $10 million, as
the only case in which a bank has acknowledged a computer hacking resulting in
financial loss. Frye, supra note 123, n. 99. Frye concludes that the private sector
should not be criticized for responding to such “naturally occurring incentives” in a
free-market economy; rather, the public and private sectors should work together to
tailor the private sector’s motivations and duties toward meeting the goal of
“reasonable preparedness and full disclosure.” Id. at 376; see also THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 4 (arguing that “the business of business is business,
not homeland security” and citing the chemical and trucking industries as examples
of sectors that have not taken adequate steps on their own to improve security).
221. See NSHS, supra note 10, at 55 (describing information as “a vital foundation
for the homeland security effort”). The White House’s National Strategy for Homeland
Security includes as its “National Vision” the goal of building a “national environment
that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information” that would give
homeland security officials “complete and common awareness of threats and
vulnerabilities.” Id. at 56.
222. GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 17; see also NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at 12
(asserting that information sharing between the government and private industry is
necessary to mitigate terrorist threats).
223. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶¶ 4, 20 (arguing that this provision may not “do
anything to increase public/private collaboration” and that the “biggest roadblock to
public/private information sharing still remains: overcoming business interests”); see
discussion supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing cultural impediments to information sharing,
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our nation’s critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks.
One
alternative to voluntary disclosures is to require information sharing
225
Such information likely
between the public and private sectors.
would still receive protections under Exemption 4: information that
is required to be submitted to the government receives Exemption 4
protection “if it is of the sort not customarily released,” and if that
disclosure would either “impair the government’s ability to obtain
necessary information in the future,” or “cause substantial harm” to
226
the submitting party. It appears that sensitive critical infrastructure
data would meet this criterion and thus be afforded Exemption 4
protection. In light of our infrastructure vulnerabilities, perhaps
227
lawmakers should consider this option.
Prior public-private
partnerships provide further options for dealing with the information
sharing problem.
b.

Lessons From Prior Successful Partnerships Could Provide the
Government With a Blueprint to Facilitate Information Sharing

The notion of public-private partnerships is not an entirely new
idea: the Clinton Administration provided a blueprint for publicprivate information sharing on critical infrastructure matters through
issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (“PDD 63”), entitled
228
“Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures.”
In light of our
country’s increased dependence on interconnected infrastructures,
PDD 63 advocated for the voluntary participation of private industry
in public-private partnerships as one means of securing sensitive
229
sectors.
In so doing, PDD 63 encouraged private industry to
establish Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to serve as a
means of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information

such as trust, that cannot be legislated by statute).
224. GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 17.
225. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 21.
226. See id. ¶ 21 & n.48 (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food &
Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); A Blackletter Statement of
Administrative Law, supra note 33, at 65-66.
227. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 21 (arguing that because Exemption 4 could still
cover information submitted voluntarily to the government, this option deserves
discussion).
228. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Protecting America’s
Critical Infrastructures: PDD 63 [hereinafter PDD 63], at http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/pdd-63.htm (May 22, 1998) (on file with the American University Law
Review). The White House issued this explanation of PDD 63 because the original
document is classified.
229. Id.; see GAO Y2K, supra note 210, at 5 (declaring that PDD 63 acknowledged
that public-private cooperation would be necessary in order to evaluate cyber-risks to
our critical infrastructure).
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between private infrastructure sectors and the government.
Following this blueprint, the Bush Administration’s National Strategy
for Homeland Security, released on July 16, 2002, assigned certain
agencies the “primary responsibility for interacting with critical
231
infrastructure sectors” in order to facilitate information sharing.
For example, under the Bush Administration’s plan, DHS will
interact with the Information, Telecommunications, and Emergency
Services sectors, whereas the Department of Health and Human
232
Services will interact with the Public Health sector.
One example of successful public-private information sharing is
the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
(“NSTAC”), created in 1982 by Executive Order 12382 (“President’s
233
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee”).
NSTAC’s industry members provide advice to the federal government
on
national
security
and
emergency
preparedness
234
telecommunications matters.
For over twenty years, this advisory
board has voluntarily advised the country’s leaders on security issues
235
regarding the telecommunications and information infrastructure.
236
As such, NSTAC stands as a model for public-private collaboration.
As an advisory board, however, NSTAC is not responsible for sharing
with the government individual members’ infrastructure
vulnerabilities.
Perhaps the best known and most successful endeavors of
information sharing on system vulnerabilities were the public-private
partnerships formed between the government and private computer
network operators in response to the potential Year 2000 (“Y2K”)
237
date conversion problem.
One possible reason why industry
complied voluntarily with the government’s information requests was
that Congress enacted a narrowly tailored FOIA provision that
230. PDD 63, supra note 228; GAO IS, supra note 154, at 6. In 2001, GAO
reported that progress in implementing PDD 63 has been slow. See id. (citing the
creation of six Information Sharing and Analysis Centers in five industry sectors).
231. NSHS, supra note 10, at 31.
232. Id. at 32.
233. NSTAC RESPONSE, supra note 152, at *14.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Similar to NSTAC, the Treasury Department chairs the Financial and
Banking Information Infrastructure Committee, which bridges a public-private
partnership focusing on security issues concerning the financial services industry.
NSHS, supra note 10, at 31.
237. See GAO Y2K, supra note 210, at 3 (summarizing the Y2K challenge as “a
major test of our nation’s ability to protect its computer-supported critical
infrastructures”). See generally NSTAC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 157, at 7-8
(describing the Y2K disclosure system and arguing that it was a successful example of
public-private information sharing).
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exempted such information from public disclosure.
Also, Y2K
information sharing was successful in part because private industry
and the government together “recognized the threat and faced a
239
fixed deadline by which time[ly] action had to be taken.”
This is
different from sector-wide critical infrastructure protection, where
240
industry faces an unclear threat for a potentially infinite duration.
One key lesson from the Y2K success story is that industry’s long241
standing disclosure concerns make it reluctant to form information
sharing partnerships without certain protections. Thus, in order to
encourage information sharing, the government should take some
action to demonstrate the importance it places on protecting
242
industry’s sensitive business information. Industry was unconvinced
that FOIA’s preexisting statutory framework protected adequately the
243
integrity of critical infrastructure data.
An official clarification of
FOIA’s preexisting exemption framework could address these
244
concerns.
However, if the government decides that it needs to
provide a greater incentive in order to strengthen national security,
the narrow FOIA exemption proposed by the Senate compromise
245
legislation provides a palatable alternative.
Regardless, the
238. Public Law 105-271, the “Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure
Act,” provides that “any Year 2000 statements or other such information provided by
a party in response to a special Year 2000 data gathering request . . . shall be exempt
from disclosure under . . . the ‘Freedom of Information Act.’”
Year 2000
Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-271, § 4(f)(3)(A), 112
Stat. 2386 (1998). NSTAC recommends legislation similar to this Act that would
protect critical infrastructure information voluntarily shared from disclosure under
FOIA, arguing that none of the preexisting exemptions would cover critical
infrastructure information. NSTAC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 157, at 9, 11.
239. Id. at 8.
240. “Without a clear and present danger, it is difficult for industry to justify
spending additional dollars” to protect its systems. Id. Unlike the Y2K problem and
its finite end-date, the challenge of securing our nation’s critical infrastructure
protection continues. GAO Y2K, supra note 210, at 20. Similar to Y2K, ongoing
critical infrastructure protection will require both public and private sector
involvement. Id. at 18.
241. See discussion supra Part IV.B (citing industry’s liability concerns as
preventing it from forming public-private partnerships).
242. Statement of Tritak, supra note 155. This assertion is supported by Harris
Miller, President of the Information Technology Association of America, who
testified in a Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that uncertainty has a
“chilling effect” on information sharing and that government must give private
industry certainty that its sensitive information would be protected. Statement of
Miller, supra note 156, at 98.
243. Miller testified that the preexisting FOIA language was not sufficient to
protect critical infrastructure data from disclosure and advocated for “the
extraordinary treatment of a complete ban on FOIA disclosure.” Id. at 102.
244. See supra note 167 and supporting text (discussing the necessity of a
clarification of current FOIA law).
245. See discussion supra Part III.B (reviewing the compromise legislation’s
narrower FOIA language and absence of immunity provisions).
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restrict the CIIA’s overly broad FOIA language.
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246

and act to

4.

The recent erosion of FOIA is a sleeper issue that could shock the public
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the public
entrusted the government to protect national security and might be
reluctant to question, or may not even be aware of, the attendant
248
The ramifications of the Bush
reduction of civil liberties.
Administration’s FOIA guidance, geared toward agencies, were not
249
Similarly, the
widely reported in the mainstream news media.
controversy surrounding DHS labor rules often eclipsed the CIIA
250
FOIA debate on Capitol Hill.
The Bush Administration must not mistake the American public’s
apparent complacency on this matter as tacit approval of expansion
of governmental secrecy. With DHS now serving as the figurehead
for the nation’s counter-terrorism efforts, expectations of enhanced
national security fall squarely upon its shoulders. The public is
251
already skeptical about DHS’s ability to safeguard our nation. One
terrorist attack would intensify public scrutiny and raise questions as

246. See Fix This Loophole, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2003, at A20 (imploring Congress
to quickly eliminate the overly broad language of the DHS FOIA provision before the
government and the public find themselves “out of the loop—on important
regulatory matters”).
247. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1 (reviewing the DHS FOIA provision’s overly
broad language and arguing that it must be more narrowly tailored so as not to
create the potential for abuse).
248. See Statement of Swire, supra note 89, at 23 (expressing concern that if
everyone is concerned with short-term gains to homeland security, it is a question
whether people will voice “long-time concerns about erosions of civil liberties”).
249. See Travis Loop, State of the Union’s Press, PRESSTIME, Feb. 2003, at 7 (quoting
Paul McMasters, First Amendment Ombudsman at the Freedom Forum, as stating
that editors must be more vigilant in sharing with readers how government access
laws contribute to the stories they read; otherwise, the public will not fully realize
how access laws like FOIA affect their daily lives).
250. See Leger, supra note 189 (defending the media’s focus on labor rules as
understandable, because disagreement over that provision led to a Senate stalemate).
Leger argues that the CIIA FOIA provision “slaps all 281 million Americans” and
serves as “Exhibit One” that this Administration will “toss favors to business and
industry.” Id.
251. A Gallup poll from early January 2003 indicated that only thirteen percent of
Americans feel “a lot” safer with the new DHS; four in ten Americans feel DHS will
not make the country safer at all. The State of Our Union: Speech Shows Growing Gap
Between Bush Rhetoric and Reality, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 29, 2003; see THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 1 (arguing that the new DHS “will not in and of itself
make Americans safer” and pinpointing problem areas within the Bush
Administration’s homeland security policies). In its assessment of security concerns
post-September 11, 2001, the Brookings Institution highlights concerns facing the
new DHS, reporting that homeland security proves overwhelming in both its
complexity and in the number of potential targets. Id. at 2.
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252

to why DHS’s mission failed.
Chances are DHS will somehow fail,
because there is no other agency that faces a more difficult task
253
involving such high risks. The public could be outraged to discover
that one practical ramification of CIIA FOIA exemption is that the
public cannot directly hold DHS—its own government—accountable
254
for its operations.
Popular distrust of government, fueled by scandal, led to FOIA’s
255
enactment and fortification.
If FOIA’s erosion continues
unimpeded, an attack on our homeland could ultimately lead to
256
demands for reform. The public is becoming increasingly aware of
these new FOIA developments through personal experience in the
request process, and through new lawsuits.
D. Current Effects of Post-September 11, 2001 FOIA Restrictions on the
Requesting Community
The immediate effects of the post-September 11, 2001 FOIA
257
restrictions on the requesting community are in dispute.
Agency
officials characterize the effects on FOIA implementation as relatively
minor, except for mail delays associated with anthrax in October

252. See Talkback Live (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 24, 2003) (quoting DHS
Secretary Tom Ridge as stating that DHS has the “unified mission of protecting
America”).
253. See GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 5 (arguing that “DHS’s national security
mission is of such importance that the failure to address its management challenges
and programs risks could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental
system, our citizens’ health and safety, and our economy”). If DHS were to fail at
protecting the homeland, this could result in grave consequences for our nation. Id.
at 3. This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that most of the agencies merged into
DHS were created for reasons largely unrelated to the nation’s current national
security concerns. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 15. As such, DHS
faces the challenge of managing these disparate groups while focusing on the
ultimate task of protecting national security. See id. at 15-16.
254. If the past is any predictor, FOIA requests often follow disastrous events and
even lead to reform. See, e.g., supra notes 20 and 27 and accompanying text (citing
the Vietnam War and Watergate as events leading to public outrage and cries for
reform). Drawing upon this experience, the public would probably file FOIA
requests with DHS if any future national security catastrophe occurs.
255. See id. (discussing FOIA’s enactment during the Vietnam War and FOIA’s
strengthening after the Watergate scandal).
256. Moreover, such events could damage public officials who support these FOIA
policies. Robert Saloschin writes that his FOIA experience taught him that “clinging
to secrecy in the face of persistent attack, even if legally warranted, can be very
damaging” to government officials—especially if others believe the secrecy to be
unwarranted. Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1407. Saloschin recalls the Watergate
scandal, when President Nixon’s withholding of information ultimately led to his
resignation. Id.
257. See GAO, supra note 22, at 3 (reporting that agency officials and FOIA
requesters view the impact of September 11, 2001, on access to government
information differently).
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258

2001.
A recent GAO Report surveyed FOIA officers at various
agencies and found that most of those officers “did not notice
changes in their agencies’ responses to FOIA requests compared to
259
previous years.”
This survey began in October 2002, one year after
the policy change initiated by the Ashcroft Memorandum and before
Congress created the new DHS. As a result, the survey did not take
into account any data regarding the level of disclosures at DHS, the
agency most likely to safeguard critical infrastructure information
due to the authority it received from the CIIA FOIA provision.
In contrast, members of the requesting community express general
concerns about the dissemination of information and access to
government information in light of the removal of information from
260
some government web sites after September 11, 2001. Importantly,
some requesters characterize DOJ’s new policy as “representing a
261
shift from a ‘right to know’ to a ‘need to know’ that could
262
discourage the public from making requests.” Many Americans are
also affected by state decisions that follow the Bush Administration’s
263
lead in narrowing the scope of FOIA disclosures.
The long-term effects of the post-September 11, 2001 FOIA
264
restrictions will not be known for some time.
“[A]ny effects may
not be clear until denials of information during this time period are
appealed, litigated, and decided—a process that could take several
265
years.”
Ultimately, it is simply too soon to determine conclusively
whether information requests now receive more scrutiny from all
266
agencies. However, one need only look to the federal courts to find
judicial responses to the Bush Administration’s new policies.

258. Id.
259. General Accounting Office, Freedom of Information Act: Agency Views on
Changes Resulting from New Administration Policy 2 (2003) (reporting that one
third of the officers surveyed noticed a decreased likelihood of disclosure postSeptember 11, 2001 and that seventy-five percent of those officers blamed the new
Ashcroft policy as the main reason for the change).
260. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 3, at 1A (reporting that the government
removed “hundreds of thousands of public documents” from its websites and that it
edited other public information); Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 502 (criticizing the
removal of information from government websites, such as the Department of
Energy website, after September 11, 2001).
261. See Beierle & Bell, supra note 135.
262. GAO, supra note 22, at 3; see also Beierle & Bell, supra note 135.
263. See Parker, supra note 3 (citing four states’ efforts to restrict disclosure laws).
264. GAO, supra note 22.
265. Id. at 3.
266. Blum, supra note 139.
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1.

Current legal challenges
On the litigation front, current FOIA lawsuits could test the judicial
267
waters of the Bush Administration’s new nondisclosure policy.
David Vladeck, a Georgetown University Law Center professor and
former litigation director of Public Citizen, commented that FOIA
results in additional litigation to obtain information that was
268
previously obtainable without a lawsuit.
Moreover, the fact that
Attorney General Ashcroft has essentially pledged a “more vigorous
defense” of agency decisions so long as they are premised on a sound
legal basis could pave the way for more difficult courtroom
269
challenges and result in less information being made public.
One FOIA success in the past year resulted from a complaint filed
by Judicial Watch regarding a purported anthrax cover-up at the
270
Washington, D.C. Brentwood mail facility.
Judicial Watch filed a
FOIA request with the U.S. Postal Service (“U.S.P.S.”) regarding
271
anthrax information. When the U.S.P.S. failed to comply with the
request, Judicial Watch filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
272
District of Columbia.
On September 11, 2002, Judge Henry H.
Kennedy, Jr. ordered the U.S.P.S. to “produce all documents or
273
portions thereof which are responsive to Plaintiff’s request.” Those
court-mandated disclosures indicated that U.S.P.S. and U.S.
government officials knew that envelopes leaked anthrax into the
facility, but those officials failed to close that facility for four more
274
days, after two Brentwood employees died from inhalation anthrax.
Based on these FOIA disclosures, Judicial Watch filed a new
complaint for a criminal investigation with the U.S. Attorney for
275
D.C.
Recently, in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Office of Homeland
276
Security, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filed a
267. See id. (detailing public interest groups’ continuing attempts to secure
information under FOIA and reporting the National Resources Defense Counsel
general counsel Sharon Buccino’s determination to challenge the White House on
the issue).
268. Id.
269. See id. (discussing Ashcroft’s FOIA guidance to agencies).
270. Judicial Watch is a public interest group that investigates and prosecutes
government corruption and abuse. Anthrax Lawsuit, supra note 12.
271. See Complaint for Criminal Investigation: Anthrax Attacks (Dec. 6, 2002)
(detailing Judicial Watch’s FOIA request), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/
cases/99/brentwoodltr.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. (listing information revealed in U.S. Postal Service documents).
275. See Anthrax Lawsuit, supra note 12.
276. No. 02-620 (D.D.C. Dec. 26, 2002), available at http://www.epic.org/
open_gov/homeland/ohs_decision.pdf (on file with the American University Law
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complaint against OHS requesting OHS to process and release
277
records. EPIC made a FOIA request on March 20, 2002, requesting
278
OHS responded
records relating to OHS’s proposed programs.
that it could not be subjected to FOIA requests because it was not an
279
agency.
The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
OHS’s motion for summary judgment and granted EPIC’s discovery
280
motion.
The Bush Administration will continue to monitor progress in that
case, as well as many other unresolved FOIA cases. Pending litigation
are cases dealing with the release of names of those detained as part
of the investigation into the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
statistics on the Justice Department’s use of new surveillance powers
authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act, information related to the
Defense Department’s “Total Information Awareness” initiative, and
data maintained by U.S. Attorney’s offices indicating how many
investigations are under way in specific categories, such as terrorism
281
or civil rights.
Although the Judicial Watch and EPIC lawsuits
demonstrate judicial compulsion of FOIA disclosure despite the Bush
Administration’s restricted FOIA policy, the broad new CIIA FOIA
exemption indicates that there still remains an overall climate of
nondisclosure post-September 11, 2001.
2.

Additional legislation in the current congressional term
The CIIA FOIA provision could lead to more debate in the 20032004 congressional term. Senator Leahy, a long-time FOIA advocate,
argued that the HSA’s flaws would need to be addressed in this
282
congressional term.
Similarly, Senator Levin declared that he
would attempt to legislate FOIA during the 108th Congress to clarify
283
the exemptions under the Act.
Indeed, the 108th Congress
revisited the FOIA issue through the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee’s confirmation hearing of now-DHS Secretary Tom
Review).
277. See id. (summarizing EPIC’s request for documents and subsequent
complaint).
278. See id. at **1-2 (quoting EPIC’s request for information on OHS plans to
implement a national system for driver’s licenses and to use biometric technology for
information purposes).
279. See id. at *2 (arguing that the court should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction over OHS, a non-agency). FOIA only applies to agency records. See
supra note 33 and supporting text (defining agency records for FOIA purposes).
280. Elec. Privacy Info. Center, No. 02-620, at *1.
281. See Blum, supra note 139 (detailing public interest groups’ use of FOIA to
compel a reluctant administration to release information).
282. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11423.
283. See Samuelsohn, supra note 83.
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284

Ridge.
In the hearing, Senator Levin focused on the CIIA’s
authorization of criminal penalties for those who disclose protected
285
sensitive information. Senator Levin argued for the need to repair
the underlying legislation because its criminal penalty and legal
immunity provisions could eventually lead companies to protect
themselves from legal actions simply by providing infrastructure
286
information to the DHS.
Building on that argument, Senator
Durbin questioned Secretary Ridge on whether he was aware that the
resulting legal immunity would severely limit ordinary citizens’
287
opportunity for legal redress.
Secretary Ridge expressed concern
about differing interpretations of the statute and stated that he would
288
work with the Senators to clarify the CIIA FOIA language.
Fulfilling the promise to keep the FOIA fight alive in the Senate,
Senators Leahy, Levin, Jeffords, Lieberman and Byrd recently
proposed new legislation to chisel away the broad barrier to
disclosure under the CIIA. Their bill, the Restoration of Freedom of
289
Information Act of 2003, (“Restore FOIA Act”) follows closely the
Senate compromise legislation that Senators Leahy, Bennett and
Levin advanced in Fall 2002. Like the compromise legislation, this
measure would limit the CIIA FOIA exemption to “records”
submitted by private entities, a much narrower standard than the
290
provision for “information” contained in the CIIA.
The bill would
284. See generally Hearing on the Nomination of Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be
Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the S. Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th
Cong. (2003).
285. See Hearing on the Nomination of Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be Sec’y of the
Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong.
37 (2003) (statement of Sen. Levin, Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Comm.)
[hereinafter Statement of Levin] (asserting that the language in the bill regarding
unclassified information is too broad because, as written, it might prevent disclosure
of information for fear of criminal prosecution); see also Hearing on the Nomination of
Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the
Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 41 (2003) (statement of Sen.
Durbin, Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Comm.) [hereinafter Statement of
Durbin].
286. See Statement of Levin, supra note 285, at 37 (describing this opportunity as a
“security blanket” for the companies).
287. See Statement of Durbin, supra note 285, at 41 (arguing that he understands
the need to protect sensitive information, but that the CIIA exceeded that by
rendering companies immune from litigation merely by making disclosures to the
DHS).
288. See Hearing on the Nomination of Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be Sec’y of the
Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong.
37, 41 (2003) (statement of Tom Ridge, Nominated to be Secretary of Homeland
Security) (arguing that it was not the intent of those who crafted the CIIA FOIA
exemption to protect wrongdoers, and that setting up the DHS’ information analysis
and infrastructure protection unit would be one of his initial tasks).
289. S. 609, 108th Cong. (2003).
290. Whereas records “refer to physical and well-defined communications,” such
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restrict the CIIA FOIA exemption to records pertaining to “the
vulnerability of and threats to critical infrastructure (such as attacks,
291
whereas the current CIIA FOIA
response and recovery efforts),”
exemption applies to any “critical infrastructure information.” In
contrast to the CIIA’s broad prohibition against disclosure, including
criminal penalties against any government employee who releases
that information for any reason, the Restore FOIA Act eschews
criminal penalties and would not forbid the use of these records in
civil court cases in order to hold companies accountable for their
292
wrongdoing or to protect the public.
The bill was referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2003 and awaits further
consideration.
With continuous lawsuits to compel the release of FOIA
information by the Bush Administration, as well as efforts to narrow
the broad CIIA FOIA language in this congressional term, a clear
exposition of the public’s rights under FOIA in our country is far
from complete.
CONCLUSION
FOIA is a critical component of our democratic government and
should be protected even in times of heightened concerns about
293
Implemented in 1966, FOIA survived the
national security.
national security crises of the Cold War without imposing severe
restrictions on the dissemination of government information.
Governmental transparency and homeland security are not
inconsistent goals. Preexisting statutory exemptions, in particular the
first and fourth exemptions, provide broad protection of sensitive
294
information, even after September 11, 2001.
Present and future efforts to erode FOIA will harm requesters who

as documents and reports, “information” is a more expansive, undefined term and
could encompass telephone calls, conversations, or other non-traditional
communications. See U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Side-by-Side Analysis of the LeahyLevin-Jeffords-Lieberman-Byrd Restoration of Freedom of Information Act of 2003 and the
Critical Infrastructure Information Subtitle of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200303/031203a.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
291. S. 609, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
292. See generally id.
293. See Clinton Memorandum, supra note 52 (arguing that because citizens in a
democratic government must have access to information, agencies should renew
their commitment to FOIA, an important means by which to disseminate
information).
294. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11423 (explaining that current
FOIA exemptions balance public safety and national security with open disclosure of
government information).
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are entitled to most of the information they seek. With the broad
new CIIA FOIA exemption and a DOJ that will vigorously defend
almost all agency FOIA decisions, the time period for responding to
the requesting public could expand greatly, especially in light of
preexisting backlogs and the amount of time it could take for
administrative appeals and further litigation.
The significance of September 11, 2001 and its impact on the
freedom of information cannot be ignored—it has affected the
perception of privacy, congressional lawmaking, and perhaps even
296
court decisions.
But this does not justify the expansion of
297
One would be
governmental secrecy post-September 11, 2001.
hard-pressed to find a spokesperson for the notion that even sensitive
information should flow unimpeded to the public in the name of
298
governmental transparency.
We all want to keep our country
secure and our people safe, but the exemption framework codified at
5 U.S.C. § 552 protects adequately against the release of sensitive data
299
that could place the U.S. at risk.

295. See GAO, supra note 22, at 57 (discussing the potential “chilling effect” of the
FOIA policy change under the Bush Administration); see also Statement of Swire,
supra note 89 (arguing that the DHS FOIA provision should have been deleted from
the Act because the provision permits the DHS to secret information it receives, even
if the information is otherwise available through FOIA requests).
296. See generally Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 1115 (examining the relationship
between privacy and secrecy and the events of September 11, 2001). After the
horrific events of September 11, 2001, “[r]egulation changes that most would have
opposed or thought impractical and overbearing before September 11 will be
welcomed.” Vartanian, supra note 101, at *2; see also Robin Toner, Some Foresee A Sea
Change In Attitudes On Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001 (discussing congressional
attitudes towards civil liberties in the wake of the September 11 tragedy), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/15/national/15CIVI.html (on file with the
American University Law Review). But see Beierle & Bell, supra note 135 (citing a
N.Y. TIMES/CBS poll from December 2001 demonstrating public concern that FOIA
will impede on core civil liberties).
297. See Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 1123-25 (arguing that the expansion in
government secrecy post-September 11, 2001 appears to be growing unimpeded with
the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act (Pub. L. No. 107-56) and closed hearings,
in conjunction with limited access to public records under FOIA).
298. See Tapscott, supra note 64 (asserting that although the Bush Administration’s
efforts address legitimate national security issues in the war against terrorism, no one
has produced an example of sensitive information that could not have been
exempted from disclosure under FOIA’s preexisting statutory exemptions); see also
Parker, supra note 3 (arguing that withholding information about certain sensitive
infrastructure sectors, including nuclear power plants, pipeline routes, chemical
supplies, and the airlines seems appropriate for national security purposes).
299. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11423 (arguing that encouraging
information sharing between the public and private sectors is a laudable goal
supported by Congress but that the FOIA exemption provided by the CIIA is an
inappropriate way to meet this goal).
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Those who believe that the overly broad cession of the public’s
300
right to know is necessary in this “war against terrorism” should
recall the remarks of a certain Republican congressman from Illinois:
[D]isclosure of government information is particularly important
today because government is becoming involved in more and more
aspects of every citizen’s personal and business life, and so access to
information about how government is exercising its trust becomes
301
increasingly important.

Donald Rumsfeld made this statement in support of FOIA in
turbulent 1966. Now the Bush Administration’s Secretary of Defense,
Secretary Rumsfeld’s words ring true in this era of increased
government secrecy, when governmental transparency appears to
302
have become a casualty of war. Only time will reveal the effects of
these new restrictions on the public’s right to government
information. As long as the Bush Administration and Congress
refuse to work within the adequate preexisting FOIA framework to
address national security concerns, the prospects for governmental
transparency in this new era appear grim.

300. See Tapscott, supra note 64 (reporting surveys indicating that Americans may
be willing to trade civil liberties for security against terrorism). But see Parker, supra
note 3 (decrying congressional silence in light of the Bush Administration’s secrecy
efforts and reporting that critics argue that the Administration’s clampdown on
disclosure is opportunistic).
301. Tapscott, supra note 64.
302. See Beierle & Bell, supra note 135.

